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Future of Europe

Selected e-articles

Abstract : À l’heure où paraît ce numéro, les élections européennes sont terminées. Nous ne reviendrons pas ici sur leurs résultats, déjà amplement commentés par ailleurs, ni sur le jeu des coalitions qui, comme l’a bien souligné Jean-François Drevet dans sa précédente chronique ( Futuribles, n° 460, mai-juin 2024), sera déterminant dans la composition du Parlement européen. Or, au cours des cinq ans à venir, eu égard à ses pouvoirs désormais importants, ce nouveau Parlement sera amené à prendre position sur l’avenir d’une Union à laquelle beaucoup reprochent d’avoir été excessivement naïve, faute d’avoir pris conscience plus rapidement du bouleversement de la scène géopolitique mondiale et de l’âpre compétition économique existant entre grandes régions. Face à cette nouvelle donne, plusieurs acteurs majeurs n’ont pas manqué de souligner, récemment, la nécessité pour l’Union européenne de se ressaisir, de changer de cap (...).

Abstract: Constitutional reform in the European Union suffers from a post-functionalist dilemma: the options that are politically viable are not democratically legitimate and the options that are democratically legitimate are not politically viable. Against the background of the recent Conference on the Future of Europe and the involvement of transnational European Citizens’ Panels, this article asks whether there is any prospect of overcoming this dilemma and organizing fundamental reform of EU institutions that is both normatively legitimate and politically viable. For this, it examines four models of EU treaty reform and the way these have figured in actual EU reform processes: Intergovernmental Conference, European Convention, informal intergovernmentalism and a Citizens Convention. The article concludes that, as long as the European Union is best characterized as a ‘demoi-cracy’ in which political deliberation takes place primarily in national public spheres, the Intergovernmental Conference remains its main and inevitable forum for constitutional reform. Hence, alternative models of EU constitutional reform should be evaluated not so much on the basis of their potential to substitute the IGC but rather on their ability to catalyse the process and to pre-commit the member state governments.

Abstract: The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) was the first initiative to include citizens in deliberations about the future of European democracy since the failed Constitutional Convention of 2002/03. Although embedded within broader trends to involve ordinary citizens in the political process, it is of specific relevance in the European context because it raises expectations of democratic catching up and relates to ongoing discussions and struggles about the constitutional character of the European Union. This article argues for a citizen-centred perspective on constitutional renewal in the European Union that places European citizens as constituent subjects at centre stage. It outlines how making the European Union accessible as a political arena allows citizens to regain control over developments that have evolved behind people’s backs. It concludes that deliberative tools of citizen participation should be used to pave the way for a wider reorganization of public authority and a renewal of the European Union’s constitutional basis.

Abstract: In this article, I ask about the extent to which the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) has advanced democracy in the European Union. I critically engage with the claim that the CoFoE’s success should not be measured by whether it enabled constituent power, or ultimately results in treaty reforms, but by the fact that, by introducing citizens’ assemblies to EU politics, it has laid the foundation for participatory democracy in the European Union. Drawing on established theories of participatory democracy, I argue that this interpretation misses the point. To put forward an alternative view, I revisit James Bohman’s concept of a democratic minimum. The best democratic defence of permanent EU citizens’ assemblies is that they could provide citizens with the capacity to initiate deliberation about common concerns – and thus function as a nucleus for constituent power in the European Union. Nevertheless, the idea should be viewed with caution, as permanent citizens’ assemblies could just as well become a democratic fig-leaf allowing EU institutions to reject calls for fundamental reforms. Much therefore depends on their institutional design.

Abstract: Tendencies of European disintegration – culminated in Brexit – have laid bare the lack of a future plan for Europe. Few extant studies contain a future outlook and often lack a public opinion perspective, albeit the latter’s relevance in the ‘constraining dissensus’ between citizens and political elites about European integration. Focusing on European Union–non-European Union relations, this study presents comparative evidence on peoples’ preferences for the future of EUrope and their underlying reasons. We map citizen preferences using original open-ended survey question responses across eight European countries from within and outside the European Union. Our results show that non-European Union citizens’ preferences deviate more strongly from the status quo compared to those of European Union citizens. In contrast, risk-taking attitudes play no role for citizen preferences.

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to analyse the involvement of the local and regional authorities within the Conference on the Future of Europe. The former, being closer to the citizens, could play important role in reaching “every corner of the European Union” and helping the citizens to articulate their ideas about the European integration. Therefore, the activity of the subnational level could contribute to the final success of the Conference (or failure – in case of lack of any actions). The analysis is based on the author’s own empirical study conducted among the Polish territorial self-government units after the closure of the Conference. The local and regional authorities were asked if they informed the citizens about the Conference, organised events regarding this enterprise or took part in the events organised by other entities. The results show very low level of the activity, even among the territorial self-government units that are present at the European level. The conclusions regard both to the Polish circumstances as well as to the general performance of the Conference. In the first case, they unveil the unwritten practice among the Polish territorial self-government units on their involvement in the European affairs. Regarding the second point, the results indicate that the Conference din not manage to exceed the “European bubble”

Abstract: This thematic issue on the causes and modes of European disintegration seeks to answer two main questions: What are the causes of (potential) European disintegration across countries? And what are the actual and potential modes of European disintegration? The articles on the causes of EU disintegration go beyond the immediate causes of Brexit, to date the prime example of European disintegration. They address, for instance, the impact of ignoring the results of referendums on EU treaty changes. The articles demonstrate that the extensively studied proximate causes of Brexit may be different from more long-term drivers of potential disintegration in the UK and other member states. The second question raises a point that has been largely overlooked. Going beyond the growing literature on Brexit, differentiated integration, and non-compliance, the articles on the modes of European disintegration address issues such as (temporary) opt-outs from the Schengen agreement. The thematic issue is innovative not only due to the questions it raises but also by deploying a multi-disciplinary social science perspective. Contributions are quantitative, qualitative, and theoretical from a wide array of social science disciplines. Taken together, the contributions to this thematic issue advance scholarly understanding of European (dis)integration.

Abstract: The article analyses the impact of Brexit on hard Eurosceptic discourses in the Visegrád Group countries from 2015 to 2023. As the negative implications of Brexit for the UK economy became clear, many hard Eurosceptics softened their rhetoric, using the referendum as a proxy for a ‘hard’ exit. Whilst the classical soft–hard typology remains dominant amongst scholars in the study of Euroscepticism, the case of Brexit shows that long‐term principled opposition to the European Union (EU) can hide behind equivocal rhetoric. The article suggests studying the changing tactics of Eurosceptics by matching current EU and domestic contexts together with the long‐term points of departure of hard Eurosceptics.

Abstract: The European Union (EU) faces a pressing challenge with democratic backsliding potentially resulting in an authoritarian member state. EU institutions have sought to safeguard member state democracy. Most normative studies submit that the EU can legitimately intervene based on either current treaties or the theory of militant democracy, but they leave unanswered the fundamental question of the EU's normative political authority. I argue that shared popular sovereignty, which entails Europe's peoples directly authorizing the EU, is the most appropriate principle to theorize the EU's political authority for the foreseeable future. This principle results in a duty for the EU to protect its democratic peoples from backsliding governments and an account of who can legitimately decide on whether backsliding is taking place. A comprehensive normative assessment follows on the democratic legitimacy of various democracy protection measures. My argument bolsters the normative case for EU democracy protection.

Abstract: Differentiated integration has become ubiquitous in the European Union today. However, the evaluation of differentiated integration by the academic community is much contested: While some see it as a remedy to political gridlock, others think of it as the beginning of the end of the EU (i.e., disintegration). Our article sheds light on the relationship between differentiated integration and disintegration from the viewpoint of subnational members of Parliament. Assuming that at least some scenarios of differentiated integration are related to disintegration, we report on data from a survey of seven EU member states about subnational members of Parliament’s preferences regarding future scenarios for the EU. Our results find that a preference for a Europe with a singular focus on “nothing but the single market” is related to a functionalist approach towards European integration and the perceived disintegration of the EU. This preference is especially prevalent among subnational MPs in the Czech Republic and Poland, both known for having opt-out solutions. While the Czech Republic constantly shows high levels of Euroscepticism in public surveys, the reverse is true in Poland. Obviously, a general commitment to the EU should not be equated with a shared common goal of further European integration. If such differences become permanent, European integration may genuinely be endangered.

Abstract: Understanding public opinion on the EU remains a pressing issue. In contrast to previous studies on EU attitudes in general, we pose the following question: Which factors help us to understand public support for five specific scenarios for the EU's future? We promote the still undertheorized identity approach that has developed alongside the utilitarian and the cue-taking perspectives. We argue that a European Social Capital - composed of trust, norms and networks with other Europeans - is related to support for further integration scenarios. The multivariate analyses are based upon a mass survey conducted in Austria. Our results show a significant correlation between higher levels of European Social Capital and positive attitudes towards scenarios for more integration. This adds to the identity approach in the literature on EU attitudes. Our study has important implications for the EU's reform debate. If people feel emotionally connected with other Europeans, they are willing to accept deeper integration processes. Pure economic arguments seem insufficient.

Abstract: Multilevel polities do not typically facilitate secession, so why did the European Union adopt Article 50? Revisiting formative debates from the 2003 Convention on the Future of Europe, we combine archival research with an original dataset of delegate debates over two levels: the existence and procedural operation of an exit article. This reveals essential new detail on the genealogy of Article 50. We locate this institutional innovation within a Rokkanian–Hirschmanian theoretical framework which treats exit closure as necessary for loyalty and resilience. Further refining this ‘polity’ perspective, we find many participants showed awareness of the potentially disruptive implications of an exit article. Yet, given extant tensions around ‘ever closer union’, a Eurocentric procedural design prevailed as a safety valve, granting EU authorities default control over any exit process. This European logic of ‘controlled opening' offers a potential blueprint for other integrating compound polities and international organizations facing backlashes from member states.

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