The new EP Library Catalogue allows you to search the EP collection for:
- Journals, books and articles in paper or electronic format
- EPRS and Policy Department publications
Publisher`s note: Virtually all JCMS Annual Review articles on the EU's engagement in and towards its eastern and southern neighbourhoods published in recent years share almost identical assessments of EU influence: depictions range from ‘stasis’ (Whitman and Juncos, 2013), ‘meagre’ (Whitman and Juncos, 2014, p. 157) and ‘marginal’ (Juncos and Whitman, 2015, p. 212) to ‘waning’ (Pomorska and Noutcheva, 2017) and, thus, echo the critique that has been voiced elsewhere (Howorth, 2016; Schumacher et al., 2018; Gstöhl, 2019). The year 2019 is no exception in this regard. EU relations with its 16 neighbouring countries have been marked by similar dynamics and trends as in previous years and continue to suffer from ambiguity, coherence problems and ‘inherent design faults and political misjudgements’ (Leigh, 2019, p. 386).
Publisher`s note: This article examines the role of local actors in the implementation of the European Union (EU) norms in the Arab Mediterranean countries (AMCs) after 2011. It argues that their role is determined by two parameters: their degree of involvement in policy formulation and the position of other external actors towards the EU norms. Based on this categorization, the article generates a typology of the application of the EU norms, and claims that their implementation in the AMCs takes a thin or a thick form. The findings of this typology suggest that holistic and Eurocentric narratives of the EU's normative power should be revisited. The implementation of EU norms must be contextualized and is conditional upon the differentiated role of local sectoral actors. For explaining the articulation of the EU's norms, this study considers two key sectors of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy: (1) democracy promotion and (2) sustainable development.
Publisher`s note: The notion of a Mediterranean Neighbourhood points to how a specific geopolitical space is scripted, imagined and then translated into practice through the European Union’s foreign policy towards this region. I contend that the Arab Spring took place within this European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework contesting many of its underlying principles. This wave of social upheaval across a marked EU vs. non-EU space enabled a series of geographical imaginations and spatial practices able to rethink the Mediterranean region otherwise. This paper introduces three concepts developed by Hamid Dabashi to the geographical debates rethinking Europe’s contours through a post/de-colonial analytical lens. Drawing from the spatial thinking that characterises Dabashi’s recent work, this paper contributes to the rich critical literature on the ENP’s macro-regional imaginary. Concretely, building on Dabashi’s notion of “liberation geographies”, I emphasise how recent organising as well as ongoing migratory movements in the region constitute serious geopolitical interlocutors able to produce alternative Mediterranean spaces.
Publisher`s note: Since the beginning of the twenty-first century and after two turning point events – 09-11 terrorist attacks and the 'Arab spring' – both migration control and democracy promotion became central issues within EU foreign policy, in particular to what concern its relations with the southern Mediterranean neighbourhood. However, although many authors allude to the relation between these two policy dimensions, little is known about their linkage. On the one hand, the debate about EU external migration policies narratives has revolved mainly around the migration-security and migration-development nexus. On the other, whereas the developmental paradigm has dominated the root-causes approach little attention has been given to its political dimension. This article aims to overcome these limitations through exploring these other nexus: the one between these policies and the democratization of southern Mediterranean countries. To investigate this nexus I follow a Narrative Policy Analysis approach - the most suitable for investigating issues of high complexity, uncertainty and polarization, which seems to be precisely the case of EU external migration policies. Hence, drawing on longitudinal and interpretative content analysis of EU official documents covering the period between 1995 and 2018, this study seeks to expose the main narratives casted by the EU on the issue and to identify if there has been consistence or change in the stories and arguments over time and in particular, before and after the 'Arab spring'. Ultimately, the goal was to confirm the presence of this nexus by exposing its complexity and trying to understand its configuration. This is considered as an important step towards further disentangling the logics and impacts of the externalization of EU migration policies towards its Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood.
Publisher`s note: In this paper, we conceptualize external Europeanization as a multi-situated and selective process of differential inclusion. The aim is to contribute to recent research on the reconfiguration of “normative power Europe” through a more proper consideration of the dialogical positioning of different typologies of both recipients and transmitters of European external policies, and local economic actors, in particular. We show how the idea of the Mediterranean as a borderscape of differential inclusion allows for an analysis that extends beyond the restrictive inside/outside binary typical of many current interpretations of the Euro-Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy. This view is especially crucial in times of decreasing European Union leverage, internal crises and geopolitical turmoil in the Mediterranean and beyond. The attempt is, therefore, to shed light on the complicated geometries of Europeanization while also emphasizing the ways in which they entangle both symbolic projections and material interests. Such a conceptualization is then applied to a case study of the border between Italy and Tunisia.
Publisher`s note: As part of a repertoire of the European Union’s (EU’s) geopolitical practices, the imaginary of Mediterranean Neighbourhood is a means with which to manage dissonance between the EU’s self-image as a normative power, changing political situations in the region and the Realpolitik of security. We argue that this also involved a ‘politics of in/visibility’ that promotes democratization and social modernization through structured cooperation while engaging selectively with local stakeholders. In directing attention to EU readings of and responses to the ‘Arab Spring’, we indicate how both a simplification of the issues at stake and highly selective political framings of local civil societies have operated in tandem. Drawing on a review of recent literature on civil society activism in the southern Mediterranean, we specifically deal with Eurocentric appropriations of civil society as a force for change and as a central element in the construction of the Mediterranean Neighbourhood. EU support for South Mediterranean civil society appears to be targeted at specific actors with whom the EU deems it can work: apart from national elites these include well-established, professionalized non-governmental organizations, and westernized elements of national civil societies. As a result, recognition of the heterogeneous and multilocal nature of the uprisings, as well as their causes, has only marginally translated into serious European Neighbourhood Policy reform. We suggest that an inclusive focus on civil society would reveal Neighbourhood as a contact zone and dialogic space, rather than a project upon which the EU is (rather unsuccessfully) attempting to superimpose a unifying narrative of EU-led modernization.
Publisher`s note: The EU’s initial reaction to the Arab uprisings in the field of energy cooperation was yet another proposal for creating an integrated Euro-Mediterranean energy market, despite the moot success of previous efforts. This paper investigates the policy frame underpinning the EU’s persistent focus on market-regulatory harmonization since the late 1990s and enquires into whether it has experienced any change in the post-uprising context. While the paper finds an enduring dominance of the market-liberal frame, it also identifies signs of its erosion through processes of reframing and misframing, affecting also the EU’s practical engagement with the region.
Publisher`s note: The strategic guidelines directing Algerian foreign policy are still dominated by normative principles inherited from the early years of the national independence war, which have underpinned the construction of the regime's legitimacy. This doctrinal position has been shaken up by new security threats coming from neighbouring countries. This article analyses the evolution of Algerian foreign policy since 2011, identifying the main constraints and obstacles that limit its ability to adapt to the new sub-regional context marked by the disintegration of the neighbouring states of Mali and Libya. Libya is in the midst of a massive security vacuum brought on by the absence of a central authority and a collapsing defence system. In Mali, in spite of the 2015 peace agreement designed to end the military and political crisis, the north is still facing high levels of violence and insecurity. This deteriorating regional security situation entails new challenges and dilemmas that are pushing Algeria to reconsider the normative foundations that have guided its foreign policy since independence, namely the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, respect for state sovereignty and support for anticolonial and revolutionary movements. Furthermore, these security concerns are also closely connected with Algeria's domestic stability in terms of both state and regime security. The article addresses the following questions: How do these intertwined internal and external factors affect Algerian foreign policy? What are the main constraints that impede the emergence of a new strategic orientation to better respond to the challenges coming from Libya and Mali?
Publisher`s note: The concept of power and the ways to measure it are central to the literature on regional security providers. The predominant model has power rooted in material capabilities. This article recognizes that such capabilities are important but contends that for a state to be become a regional security provider, it must meet certain preconditions, foremost amongst them: possession of necessary material and ideational capacity; judicious employment of such power resources; and regional recognition of its leadership. Obvious as it may sound, effective leadership is also heavily contingent upon the domestic performance of regional powers. In this regard, the choice of Algeria and Morocco provides an interesting comparative case to broaden the traditional determinants of how to categorize regional security providers.
Publisher`s note: Since independence, intra-Maghrebi relations have been marked by a pattern of bilateral rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, which has conditioned the construction of the Maghreb and hampered regional integration initiatives. This article discusses the impact of political transformations on this longstanding pattern of behavior since 2011. The sub-regional context in the area is tumultuous, due to the deterioration of the security situation in Mali and Libya. The article examines the competition between the two countries to be seen by the international community as good partners, exporters of security and stability in the region. The rivalry has been reshaped in two principal areas: the competition for the role of mediator in the conflicts in Mali and Libya, and the competition to show expertise in the fight against terrorism and the processes of religious radicalization
Publisher`s note: The massive mobilization known as the Hirak (movement) which gathered millions of protesters in weekly demonstrations against the Algerian regime throughout 2019, underscores the strengths and weaknesses of both leaderless protests and electoral authoritarianism. Leaderless grassroots movements are effective in disrupting the pseudodemocratic tools that authoritarian elites use to remain in power, but they are less efficient at proposing institutional alternatives. The deeply flawed Algerian elections of December 2019 illustrated how a military-backed regime could ensure continuity in the ruling elite, at a cost to its legitimacy. The Hirak highlights the democratic evolution of societies in the Arab Muslim world and the slow but not yet decisive weakening of electoral authoritarianism.
Publisher`s note: The literature on democratic transitions considers the participation of new parties in the first pluralist election in a post-authoritarian context (founding election) as something to be taken for granted. As such, it is never questioned. Specialists in democratic transitions ignore the research on “new parties,” which is, nonetheless, essential to the understanding of the particular characteristics of a post-authoritarian situation. Using an original qualitative study on Algeria, this article proposes to bring to light the political, organizational, and legal conditions of new political parties’ participation or nonparticipation in a founding election. In particular, this research allows us to grasp the dilemmas and difficulties faced by leaders of new parties and the types of support on which they rely to engage for the first time in an electoral competition. The analytical framework stemming from this “case study” is applicable to other national case studies.
Publisher`s note: The main paradox of the civil–military relations theory has been the protection of the political sphere from the military, which is administered by the politicians. The new dilemma lies under the paradox that occurs when the political sphere is entirely co-opted by the military, which is legitimized through democratization instead of protection of the civilian sphere. The question regarding the continuity of the pathology, the military superiority over the civil administration, has been largely omitted. This study is an attempt to respond to this conundrum related to the continuity of pathological civil–military relations. The main focus is the pathology that occurs when the military is the modernizer or the democratizer in a country. The study uses process tracing to collect the data as research attempts to unravel the rationale behind the continuity of military dominance in politics. In doing so, it will attempt to trace the causality between the lack of democratization and military dominance over politics in the case of Algeria.
Publisher`s note: This article draws on the Algerian regimes of Chadli Benjedid and Abdelaziz Bouteflika to critically evaluate Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s dimension of linkage. The paper shows that, despite the intensification of the country’s ties to the EU from one regime to the other, the willingness and ability of Brussels to put democratizing pressure on Algiers decreased rather than increased. This development challenges Levitsky and Way’s thesis and the importance they place on linkage in relation to their other dimensions of leverage and organizational power. The article concludes that: strengthening linkage does not always result in greater EU or Western democratizing pressure; the balance of importance Levitsky and Way strike between their dimensions is open to question; and, the EU has grown less willing to press for political change in Algeria.
Publisher`s note: The article focuses on the factors which created the anti-regime pressure that prompted the 2019 rebellion in Algeria although many factors associated with Algerian politics reduced the chances for mass protests in 2011. Topics include history of oil production in Algeria and hydrocarbon resources that it possesses, the belief that oil revenues delayed upheaval in Algeria, and the ineffective economic policies followed by the government to deal with inflation.
Publisher`s note: This paper shows how the constitutional provisions related to the state of emergency and exception, although they are contained within democratic traditions, were set to operate in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia as a mechanism of basic control and maintenance of liberal autocracies. The state of emergency model was used for the survival of regimes in times of instability and social unrest, leading in some cases to the suspension of human rights for many years. Nevertheless, these provisions were modified or lifted when the regime had to show a more convincing stake to the democratic process in 2011.
Publisher`s note: Islam, in its relation between state and politics, has often been used to strengthen the sense of national identity or as a tool of self-legitimation by Arab regimes to gain the support of the people. This happened in Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, where the state not only co-opted religion for official purposes but absorbed the ‘ulamā’, the religious establishment, in the administration as simple employees of newly created institutions, such as the High Islamic Councils. This article aims to shed light on these little-known organizations, one of the regime’s keystones to having a firm hold on their power.
Publisher`s note: While the EU has long been promoting economic reforms in neighbouring countries, scant attention has hitherto been paid to its regulatory efforts. This paper addresses this empirical gap with reference to the EU's promotion of regulatory reforms in three economic sectors in Egypt: agriculture, banking and telecoms. It finds that these reforms are significantly, if selectively, informed by ordoliberal principles and practices. Two theoretical implications of this finding are explored. On the one hand, while this substantiates the institutional isomorphism hypothesis, for which the EU tends to export its own models elsewhere, the selectivity with which this occurs demonstrates greater instrumentality than usually maintained in this literature. On the other hand, understanding ordoliberalism as a variation within the neoliberal template shaping restructuring in Egypt, this paper moves beyond binary views of regulatory co‐operation and competition and thus also enriches debates on the EU as a global regulator.
Publisher`s note: The EU was unsure how to react to the 2013 military coup in Egypt. It had pledged to end unconditional cooperation with despotic rulers in its Southern neighborhood, but deemed a popular military regime more capable of stabilizing the country. The Egyptian leadership’s main concern, in turn, has always been regime survival. Initially, this meant warding off the most pressing domestic challenges by silencing all opposing voices and manifesting its power grip; an endeavor for which it did not consider the EU to be helpful. As a consequence, relations cooled down, but both sides began to reach out to each other shortly thereafter. This article describes and explains the gradual rapprochement by tracing how and why the EU’s and Egypt’s perceptions, priorities and policies changed over time.
Publisher`s note: The article highlights the Egypt's current political landscape and its authoritarian government. Topics include improvements made in Egyptian economic and social conditions; prevalence of human suffering due to increased poverty, inflation, and human rights violations; and trust of public in government policies and have lost trust in politicians and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Publisher`s note: The article offers information on the memorandum of justification under the Presidentship of Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi for the waiver of human rights–based restrictions on U.S. military funding to Egypt. Topics discussed include information on the increased restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of association and the right of peaceful assembly; discussions on the regional trajectory that saw numerous countries ravaged by armed conflict and consolidation of authoritarian rule; and the information on the increased torture and police brutality in Egypt.
Publisher`s note: This article argues that the new EU’s selective engagement with Islamist parties in its Southern neighbourhood following the Arab uprisings is the result of a partial shift in the EU’s frame used to understand political Islam, combined with a form of pragmatism that puts a premium on finding interlocutors in the region. Using the case studies of Tunisia and Egypt, it shows that the EU has replaced its previous monolithic conception of political Islam with an understanding that is more sensitive to differences among Islamists. This opens the door to some forms of engagement with those actors that renounce violence and demonstrate their commitment to work within the confines of democratic rules, while violent strands of political Islam and conservative groups remain at arm’s length.
Publisher`s note: Scholars have long held that Islamism—defined as a political ideology that demands the application of Islamic holy law and the deepening of religious identity—is in part a response to Western domination of Muslim lands. Drawing on the literatures on nationalism and international relations theory, we argue that Islamism is one of a menu of options that Muslims may adopt in response to Western hegemony—a menu that includes Arab nationalism and pro-Western accommodation. We hypothesize that a Muslim’s ideological response to Western domination is a function of the type of domination experienced—that is, military, cultural, or economic—as well as of individual-level characteristics such as intensity of religious practice. We test this hypothesis with a nationally representative survey experiment conducted in Egypt. We find that, among subjects in our study, pro-Western responses to Western domination were more common than “Islamist” or “nationalist” ones and that these were particularly driven by reminders of the West’s economic ascendancy. These findings suggest that foreign domination does not always yield defensive responses and often produces desires for greater cooperation with the hegemon.
Publisher`s note: Unprecedented levels of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood, and the widespread acceptance of this violence by Egyptians following the July 2013 military coup, have been under-examined by scholars of both critical security studies and Middle East politics, reflecting implicit assumptions that state violence is unexceptional beyond Europe. This article explores how the deployment of such levels of violence was enabled by a securitization process in which the Egyptian military successfully appropriated popular opposition to Muslim Brotherhood rule, constructing the group as an existential threat to Egypt and justifying special measures against it. The article builds on existing critiques of the Eurocentrism of securitization theory, alongside the writings of Antonio Gramsci, to further refine its application to non-democratic contexts. In addition to revealing the exceptionalism of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood and highlighting the important role of nominally non-state actors in constructing the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to Egypt, the article also signals the role of securitization in re-establishing authoritarian rule in the wake of the 2011 uprising. Thus, we argue that securitization not only constitutes a break from ‘normal politics’ but may also be integral to the reconstitution of ‘normal politics’ following a period of transition.
Publisher`s note: This paper uses Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception as a theoretical approach that allows us to see how emergency legislations operate in the region as mechanisms of control and dominant paradigms of governance. Relying on Egypt as a case study, this paper traces the significance of emergency rule throughout Mubarak’s era up until Al Sisi’s 2014 Constitution. It applies a four-stage analytical framework to investigate whether or not Egypt was indeed ruled by the exception throughout its turbulent recent history, while under the guise of Emergency Rule. In doing so, we aim to provide an analysis of the legal structures that shape Egyptian politics, while also adding to debates on the State of Exception, particularly on its application in the non-Western world.
Publisher`s note: Unprecedented street protests brought down Mubarak’s government and ushered in an era of competition between three rival political groups in Egypt. Using daily variation in the number of protesters, we document that more intense protests are associated with lower stock market valuations for firms connected to the group currently in power relative to non-connected firms, but have no impact on the relative valuations of firms connected to rival groups. These results suggest that street protests serve as a partial check on political rent-seeking. General discontent expressed on Twitter predicts protests but has no direct effect on valuations.
Publisher`s note: This paper sheds light on the role of non‐governmental/civil society organisations, as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in the externalisation of migration management in Tunisia and Egypt. These organisations are involved in migration‐related activities, which, from the externalisation perspective, should prevent people from attempting the sea‐crossing to Europe, thus immobilising them in North Africa. The paper is an ethnographic border regime analysis drawing on extensive fieldwork. It shows that European Union‐externalisation is not a univocal and smooth process. Instead, externalisation is entangled in a complex network of actors and dynamics. Measures meant to support externalisation may produce effects contrary to those envisaged, whereas practices accomplishing externalisation goals may be in fact the result of internalisation. By analysing the various actors in their diverse practices and in their—sometimes conflictual—relationships, the paper also tries to minimise state‐centrism and Euro‐centrism in the study of externalisation.
Publisher`s note: The 2010–11 Arab uprisings continue to prompt a great deal of discussion. By focusing specifically on Tunisia and Egypt, this article aims to present a more dynamic account of revolutionary moments in these countries. It does so in two ways. First, the changing nature of structures and mechanisms of authoritarian domination over time is explored. Second, the convergences of different social classes and political forces during the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt are not treated as unique and static occurrences. By showing how the two revolutionary networks gradually emerged and enlarged, a truer picture is thus provided. By doing so, this article aims to contribute to a more nuanced interpretation of the two revolutionary outbursts and to the development of the fourth generation of revolutionary studies.
Publisher`s note: Previous work on political tolerance has overwhelmingly focused on established democracies. Consequently, our knowledge continues to be limited with regard to the drivers of tolerance in less democratic transitional and nondemocratic settings. In this paper, we examine what could best promote tolerance of least-favored political groups in such contexts. We use a survey experiment in Egypt to test competing theories through exposing respondents to different primes, emphasizing the importance of tolerance on the basis of religious, economic, or government endorsements. Respondents were then asked questions to gauge their tolerance levels toward their least-favored group. We control for the level of trust in government, religiosity, interpersonal trust, contact, and political knowledge. Our data show soaring levels of intolerance among Egyptians. However, we found evidence that priming respondents with the economic benefits of having a tolerant society is the most effective way to promote tolerant attitudes, especially among those with lower levels of education and younger age groups. Additionally, our analysis demonstrated that respondents’ level of trust in government has a strong effect on tolerance attitudes.
Publisher´s note: The events that followed the revolution of 25 January 2011 demonstrated the tenacity and resilience of gendered dissent and its centrality to collective action and civil disobedience, thus enriching the transnational feminist archive with the experiences and praxis of gendered revolutionary action. Paying particular attention to women’s activism during the uprisings in Egypt, this article focuses on the broader themes of gendered political resistance and the intersections of gender ideology, state policing, Islamism and militarism with protest and collective action. The aim is to take count of the challenges and gains of gendered resistance and women’s political participation during times of political upheaval.
Publisher`s note: The discipline of International Relations (IR) is dominated by American and American-trained scholars, who transmit American priorities, theories, methodologies, and approaches throughout IR departments around the world. Under these conditions, Israel has been used only infrequently as a case study for the development of IR theory. But Israel is rich in variables that can be used to generate new theoretical explanations and comparisons. Doing this requires Israel scholars to give more attention to newer theoretical and epistemological developments in the discipline. To illustrate this, the article discusses a survey of seven IR journals, coded for how Israel was used in the discussion of IR topics, theories, and cases. It then suggests some avenues for future research that Israel scholars who work in IR can use to bring Israel into IR theory development and knowledge generation.
Publisher`s note: The article offers information on controversial foreign relation between Israel and Europe. Topics discussed include during 1980s, Israel was often accused by European media of committing crimes reminiscent of World War II, the Europe welcomed the Oslo agreements in 1980s and soon blamed Israel for their failure, and Franco–Israeli alliance had been engendered by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Publisher`s note: Frustration over right-wing Israeli policies on Palestine has held back the advance of EU-Israel relations, but has not yet led to EU-wide pressure.
Publisher`s note: The article focuses on the relationship of Israel with European Union and visegard states including political relations, security relations and common goals. The article mentions Israel's efforts to solidify alliances with nations to address particular issues such as dealing with international opinion and actions, and sources of leverage identified by Israeli government that is, confronting criticism from European Union institutions and local NGOs and defend accusations leveled at that region.
Publisher's note: The article analyses how the Europeans (meaning European states and the EC/EU) have progressively turned a discourse about the Israeli-Palestinian border into a foreign policy practice. While much of the literature highlights the existence of a ‘gap between discourse and practice’ when it comes to Europeans’ foreign policy stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, we argue that the gap is dynamic and has changed across time. In the absence of an internationally and locally recognised border between Israel and Palestine, the Europeans have aimed at constructing one on the 1949 armistice line, the so-called Green Line. They have done so in stages, by first formulating a discursive practice about the need for a border, then establishing economic practices in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and most recently practicing a legal frame of reference for relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on the Green Line. The outcome is that, for what concerns European countries and EU legislation, the Green Line has been increasingly taken as the Israeli-Palestinian border. However, gaps never fully close and more contemporary events seem in fact to point to a re-opening of the gap, as the article explores.
Publisher`s note: The role of law has received only scarce attention in the emerging debate on framing EU policy. Addressing this research gap, we develop a concept of legal framing that identifies different strategies through which frame entrepreneurs can shape the policy debate by activating the structural power of the law. We demonstrate the relevance of these strategies for the case of the negotiations for an Israel-Europol agreement in which the NGO MATTIN Group has emerged as an influential frame entrepreneur. The NGO conclusively established that the initial draft of the Israel-Europol agreement deviated in important respects from the EU’s own legal position. Over time, the EU increasingly felt compelled to maintain the unity and consistency of EU law, asking a number of additional conditions from Israel. The EU’s new stance had important implications for the deadlocked Israel-Europol negotiations as well as for EU-Israeli contractual relations more broadly.
Publisher`s note: The foreign policy of Israel, a key power in the Middle East, amid the Arab uprisings, has received limited attention. The conventional wisdom purported by the current debate, which is that Israel adopted a “defensive, non-idealist” realist foreign policy posture [A. Magen, "Comparative assessment of Israel's foreign policy response to the 'Arab Spring'", 'Journal of European Integration' 37(1), 2015: 113-133; Abstr. 65.2309] in the wake of the Arab uprisings, is wrong. Rather, utilizing an innovative approach linking foreign policy analysis (FPA) and the literature on framing, we demonstrate that Israel adopted a foreign policy stance of entrenchment, predicated on peace for peace not territory, reinforcing Israel's military capabilities, and granting limited autonomy to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. The article demonstrates how framing can usefully be operationalized to uncover how binary discourse does not merely reflect foreign policy but is, in fact, constitutive of it.
Publisher`s note: The article examines the strategic calculations, assessments and dynamics behind Israel's decision to establish the so called "Southern Syria Region" (SSR) as an undeclared security zone on the Syrian Golan Heights with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. The article likewise considers Israel's policy vis-à-vis various rebel groups and other actors in the SSR and ultimately, what led Israel to end its intervention once the Syrian army returned to the area.
Publisher`s note:The article analyses the effect of Israel’s new maritime orientation on its foreign policy. It first demonstrates that in the last two decades Israel has changed its maritime posture in three important ways: it has developed energy dependence on offshore gas, begun extensive seawater desalination and dramatically expanded its navy’s platforms and missions. The paper then investigates the effects of these changes on Israel’s bilateral relations with its neighbours. Finally, the paper highlights the cumulative effect of these changes as well as some of their implications for Israel’s foreign policy.
Publisher`s note: This article raises the question whether Israel is a stable or an unstable democracy. Its conclusion – based on a theoretical analysis that relates to variables such as the legitimacy of the regime, its effectiveness, the degree of general consensus it enjoys in society at large and amongst the elites, its party system and polarisation, its socioeconomic structure, the centrality of security issues, its constitutional structure and electoral system, and the international environment – is that it is unstable. The article’s approach is comparative and relates Israel to historical case studies, like post-World War I Weimar Germany, Italy, Britain and the US; post-World War II Germany, France, Italy, and Spain; the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe; and the Third World.
Publisher`s note: Israel was established as a welfare state that sought to provide social justice to its citizens. From 1948 to the late 1970s the political system was run by a social-democratic party that envisioned the creation of a ‘just’, ‘egalitarian’ and ‘inclusive’ society. In 1977, the Likud party gained power and Israelis expected the new government to change the rules of the game, removing existing welfare systems and drastically reducing government control of the economy. Though very few, if any, of the anticipated changes were carried out, broad sectors of the Israeli public believed that the Likud government had changed the face of the Israeli economy and society. This article examines the characteristics of the Israeli welfare system and suggests an explanation for the gap between the way it is viewed and what exists on the ground.
Publisher's note: Since the early 2000s, Israel has adhered to a particularly virulent strain of economic neoliberalism which has led to an unprecedented rise in nationwide levels of poverty and inequality. Attempts to explain this phenomenon have ignored a key aspect: The need of Israel and especially its right-wing governments to create an economic reality that reduces the pressure Israel faces from the international community in the wake of its continued occupation of the territories.
Publisher`s note: This study examines the impact of trade openness, poverty, and inequality on inclusive growth in developing economies, taking Jordan as an example. Using panel data from 1990 to 2015, it examines the relationship between trade openness policies, growth rates, poverty, and income inequality in various provinces of Jordan. The empirical analysis assesses whether trade openness policies and reforms have enhanced income equality, and reduced poverty across provinces. Further, within the framework of inclusive growth, the study explores how per capita income growth has changed after trade openness reform. Different econometric techniques, such as the generalized method of moments, fully modified ordinary least square, and dynamic ordinary least square, are employed to assess the relationship between trade openness, poverty, inequality, and inclusive growth. To determine the univariate properties of the series under investigation, two panel unit root tests, based on Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Hadri (2000), are implemented. Both aggregate and provincial level panel data are used. Furthermore, two panel cointegration tests are employed--Kao (1999) and Pedroni's (1999) residual cointegration-based tests. The empirical results show that trade openness has a positive and significant effect on inclusive growth, though it is substantially weakened by poverty and income inequality at the national and provincial levels. This inequality is the likely cause for the small contribution of trade openness to inclusive growth. The effect of trade on inclusive growth is significantly positive for all provinces, but the contribution of trade openness varies according to local and provincial factors. Consequently, this study recommends better policies for promoting sustainable and inclusive growth--policies that amend inequality and reduce poverty are more likely to enforce the positive effect of trade openness on inclusive growth. Finally, the study contributes to existing literature, and assists local and international policymakers in understanding the effect of trade openness on inclusive growth at the country and provincial levels. To the best of our knowledge, this is possibly the first attempt to analyze inclusive growth in Jordan.
Publisher`s note: This essay examines the implications of the continued spread of Covid-19 on the political, economic and security challenges that confront Jordan. It argues that the country’s response to the pandemic constitutes a significant juncture in the counter-revolt and counter-reform in the region. The reactions of the Jordanian government unfolded as a process of power consolidation in the office of the appointed prime minister while weakening the democratic institutions, organized socio-political dissent and civil society. Through this policy, the Government has sought to pre-empt popular demands for political reforms and participation in a context where the rentier social contract has become unsustainable. The deferred Israeli plan to formally annexe parts of the West Bank represents serious threats to the tenuous balance in the country and its century-long security strategy. Although the survival of the Hashemite Kingdom has been at stake many times throughout its history, the post-Covid-19 confluence of challenges is unique. The country’s reliance on a conventional security-driven approach may not just fail to address the problem but could increase the risks.
Publisher`s note: Jordan is one of the last bastions of stability in an otherwise volatile region. However, its stability is threatened by a continuing economic crisis. In a survey conducted across all twelve governorates in 2017, only 22 percent of citizens view Jordan's overall economic condition as 'good' or 'very good' compared to 49 percent two years ago. Against this backdrop of economic frustration, Jordan is embarking on a decentralization process at the local level in an attempt to bring decision-making closer to the citizen.
Publisher`s note: Both reform and revolutionary movements in the Arab world have called on institutions of state to follow through on the cries for dignity, bread and social justice emanating from the street. These movements are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and may demonstrate overlapping commonalities of practice. Asef Bayat has designated this phenomenon an example of 'refo-lution', the amalgamation of a revolutionary agenda with a reform process. This paper will argue that 2011/2012 demonstrations in Jordan fall into this category, and that they elucidate that the relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and Jordanian society needs to be reframed for political stability.
Publisher`s note: This article discusses the Arab Spring in Jordan and the reasons the Hashemite regime was able to survive it. Liberals, retired military officers, young people, members of tribes, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood all participated in the demonstrations against the regime, which began in January 2011. In the beginning, it seemed that diversified demonstrations would bring about the regimeÆs collapse, as happened in other Arab countries. But in the end, it turned out that each group acted in its own interests. Tribal leaders worried about economic concerns, liberals sought to promote political reform, and the Muslim Brotherhood demanded the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.
Publisher`s note: This article discusses the Arab Spring in Jordan and the reasons the Hashemite regime was able to survive it. Liberals, retired military officers, young people, members of tribes, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood all participated in the demonstrations against the regime, which began in January 2011. In the beginning, it seemed that diversified demonstrations would bring about the regimeÆs collapse, as happened in other Arab countries. But in the end, it turned out that each group acted in its own interests. Tribal leaders worried about economic concerns, liberals sought to promote political reform, and the Muslim Brotherhood demanded the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.
Publisher`s note: Framing the analysis in Jordan’s foreign and security policy, this article discusses Jordanian migration diplomacy in relation to incentives offered by the EU. It is demonstrated that the unstable situation resulting from the long-lasting Syrian crisis has created a need for the Jordanian state to develop new political strategies, adjusting institutional policies and practices to the EU’s conditionalities regarding democratic progress and socio-economic reforms. The article takes its point of departure in the concept of migration diplomacy and bases its analysis of how the Jordanian government has developed its institutional flexibility on the theory of historical institutionalism.
Publisher`s note: The article highlights the European Union and Lebanon's multilateral refugee governance, as of July 2018. Topics discussed include political, socio-economic, and humanitarian stress due to the massive influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon; challenges among Syrian refugees in Lebanon; and Lebanon's contextual complexity associated with Syrian refugees.
Publisher`s note: In 1943, on the eve of Lebanon's independence, the Maronite president, Bishara al‐Khuri, and the Sunni prime minister, Riad al‐Sulh, formulated the National Pact, which aimed to regulate political life and bridge the different aspirations of the Lebanese communities. The Pact stipulated that power would be shared on a communal basis. Another aspect of the Pact concerned Lebanese foreign policy. Here, too, the Pact attempted to mediate between the aspirations of the Christians and those of the Muslims. For their part, the Christians — especially the Maronites — aimed for separatism, independence from Lebanon's Arab surroundings, and attachment to the West. The Muslims, particularly the Sunnis, wished to connect with the Arab world, especially with Syria. Hence, the Pact stipulated that Lebanon should take the middle road, adhering neither to East nor West. In fact, the Pact dictated a kind of neutrality in foreign affairs, enabling Lebanon to act as a middle man, a connecting factor between opposing elements.
Publisher`s note: The article explores the history of and current relations (as of 2019) between Russia and Lebanon. Topics discussed include business deals between the Russian natural gas producer Novatek and the Lebanese government, the substantial Christian community in Lebanon and the network of religious and secular organizations formed to lobby for Moscow's interests in Lebanon by President Vladimir Putin. The author reports that Russia's growing influence in the country is worrying to some Lebanese politicians. The political and social climate in Syria is also examined.
Publisher`s note: This study examines the extent to which confessional identities in Lebanon are responsible for shaping individual views toward their government. Specifically, I investigate disparities between religious groups in their perceptions of democracy and democratic principles as applied in Lebanon. Using nationally representative data from the Arab Barometer's survey of Lebanon, I find that when compared to Maronite Catholics, Druze, and Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims consistently give higher evaluations of the democratic condition of Lebanon. When compared to members of other religious groups, Shia Muslims are also more trusting of government institutions and perceive Lebanon to be freer. I find little evidence that the application of consociational theory equally and proportionally represents the political needs of the religious groups intended to be served. Rather, my findings reveal religious disparities in evaluations of democracy and political institutions in Lebanon, supporting critics of consociationalism who argue that consociationalism essentializes group-identity to political disputes.
Publisher`s note: This article revisits the concept of semi-consociational democracy and distinguishes it from full consociationalism. Semi-consociationalism features just two of the characteristics of full consociationalism, proportionality and segmental autonomy, and exists without strong grand coalitions and veto powers. The case studies of prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq demonstrate this new category of power sharing, which relies on three conditions: concentration of executive powers in the presidential office (prewar Lebanon) or premiership (post-invasion Iraq), communal hegemony in the system, and communal control over the armed forces. Full consociationalism then is mistakenly blamed for democratic failure in these two case studies.
Publisher`s note: This article explores the influence of national politics on shaping responses to refugee crises in the Middle East. The article focuses on the case of Lebanon, typically described as a weak or failed state, to explain the progression of policies the Lebanese government used to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis. By using qualitative data from interviews with political officials, the article conceptualizes the change in relations between the Lebanese government and UN agencies as evidence of a progression in policies by the Lebanese government. Moving from largely a policy of no-policy, as the crisis in Syria turned into a protracted conflict, we depict Lebanon as moving from a mere recipient of aid from the UN to a more active player in shaping crisis-response policies.
Publisher`s note: Lebanon`s complex consociational democracy has been the subject of intense scholarly debate, especially with regard to its outdated and controversial electoral system. This paper argues that the current majoritarian electoral laws serves to undermine democracy and exacerbate sectarian tensions, as it now runs counter to the original integrationist goals for which it was designed. After exploring the numerous existing reform proposals within the broader debate on power sharing in divided states, an alternative electoral formula that accounts for Lebanon`s political geography and reform objectives shall be proposed. This multi-phased approach could in turn provide a framework for electoral engineering in other conflict-ridden, multi-ethnic states.
Publisher`s note: The article discusses whether Lebanon can rebuild its problematic political system that was revealed by the devastating explosion in capital Beirut in August 2020. Also cited are how Lebanon's political elites plundered the country's resources, the government's rejection of an international probe on the blast, and the growing protests in the country due to the new tax imposed on popular messaging service WhatsApp.
Publisher`s note: Four drivers will determine Libya-EU relations over the next decade. These drivers will in turn depend on four factors: on the one hand, whether the current European foreign policies of limited scope are replaced by (1) a more cohesive EU foreign policy or (2) a broader framework − described in this paper as the political will to take on the political cost of hegemony; on the other hand, the extent to which the current multiplication of non-effective governmental institutions in Libya will be replaced by (3) national governance and (4) to what extent this governance will be pluralistically inclusive. The following paper puts forward four scenarios based on these drivers. The first describes an authoritarian national Libyan government cooperating in the context of European foreign policies predominantly focused on terrorism and migration. The second foresees the same multiplicity and limited scope of European foreign policies, while anarchy reigns in Libya. The third juxtaposes a more cohesive and broad EU foreign policy with anarchy in Libya, while the fourth presupposes inclusive national Libyan governance and the move towards a coherent EU foreign policy of a broader thematic scope.
Publisher`s note: The Libyan crisis has been a litmus test for European unity and the EU's ability to act together. Europe's relations with post-revolutionary Libya and European policies on Libya have been characterized by the frequently conflicting interests of Paris, London and Rome, with Berlin emerging as a result of a UN invitation to try and put an end to the instability in Libya. Until the January 2020 Berlin summit, European political and diplomatic interaction with Libya was the domain of EU Member States, with the EU being limited to performing the familiar functions of lending its administrative weight to joint policy roles such as countering migration, promoting business or supporting a developmental road towards stability. All in all, EU strategy remains committed to decision-making mechanisms at Member State level; however, what is exposed in Libya is that the EU toolbox can be a valuable weapon if Europe has a coherent stance. A continuing struggle between member states over how to handle the new world that is emerging in the wake of the Pax Americana is also exposed in European policy on Libya.
Publisher`s note: Almost without warning, Libya seems to have become the new geopolitical arena for the Middle East in North Africa. Its new status is the consequence of Turkey’s decision to intervene in the Libyan political quagmire in support of the internationally-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli at the end of 2019. That decision by Ankara has, at a stroke, called into question a series of assumptions that have guided Western policy in the Southern Mediterranean over the past decade. It has also raised questions about NATO, an organisation of which Turkey is itself a member, with respect to its ‘Southern Flank’ policy, and about NATO’s likely response to the parallel involvement of Russia in Eastern Libya, alongside apparent American indifference to the regional geopolitical changes that these developments imply. At the same time, the Turkish initiative has integrated the geopolitics of North Africa into parallel developments in the Middle East which have, ever since 2011, created new alignments between states sympathetic to moderate political Islam and their counterparts who ferociously resist an interaction between secular and theocratic politics.
Publisher's note: A meeting in Berlin in January 2020 dedicated to a settlement in Libya — unlike the failed international conference held in Palermo in 2018 — leaves a slight hope for the implementation of conditions laid out in its final document. The essence of the proposals is to fix the state of things established in Libya at the end of last year. The meeting in Istanbul between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan that preceded the negotiations in Berlin implied the same thing. Their joint statement after the talks on January 8, 2020, stressed the impossibility of a unilateral solution to the Libyan problem: “Seeking a military solution to the ongoing conflict in Libya only causes further suffering and deepens the divisions among Libyans.”
Publisher`s note: Six years after the 2011 revolution that toppled the Gaddafi regime, the political transition in Libya is at a standstill. The fragmented security landscape fuels chronic local conflicts, lawlessness, and insecurity, and paralyzes the political transition with destabilizing consequences on its neighbors. What explains the rapid, profound, and lasting security fragmentation that affected post-Gaddafi Libya? Notwithstanding the manifest failures of the international intervention during and after the 2011 conflict, this article argues that the security fragmentation in post-Gaddafi Libya is deeply rooted in domestic economic, cultural, and political factors. In particular, the Libyan economy offers almost no employment opportunities, and the country lacks a unitary government and functioning state institutions that it needs to redistribute its oil wealth. Under these circumstances, Libyans attempt to cope with economic hardship, insecurity, and lawlessness by turning towards their family, tribe, neighborhood, or ethnic group, thereby fueling the fragmentation of security. Libya’s current security fragmentation and instability can be seen as part of the messy historical process of state formation. During this phase, political and security agreements are brokered and institutionalized through localized processes of rebel governance whose realm of possible arrangements are determined by contextual economic, political and cultural constraints.
Publisher`s note: This article discusses the EU's response to the recent Libyan ‘migration crisis’. The central Mediterranean migration route, via Libya, is now the principal route for mixed flows into the EU – primarily owing to the non-existence of a Libyan state to enforce migration controls in collaboration with the EU. The situation in Libya itself is dire, with extensive human rights violations committed against mostly African migrants. While the EU's efforts to curb migration from Libya through enhanced maritime patrol operations have been largely unsuccessful, the recent Italian–Libyan collaboration seems to have led to a significant reduction in the number of migrants departing from Libya's shores. In addition, the EU has also been enlisting transit countries further south – Niger, in particular – in its migration control efforts, with the provision of financial and other resources for capacity-building in migration management. Overall, the EU persists with buttressing its fortress, continues to push for the external hosting of refugee populations within the region and intensifies its collaboration with countries with a dismal track record in terms of respecting the rights of migrants and refugees.
Publisher`s note: This article analyses the role of the African Union (AU) during the Libyan crisis of 2011. It addresses the question of why the AU has not played a central conflict manager role in that crisis. Inspired by pragmatic eclecticism, we take a theoretical detour to answer this question. Through a neoclassical realist and post-structuralist lens, we provide a novel eclectic reconsideration of the crisis response and we also highlight shared ground between both perspectives. Our theoretical and empirical discussion moves along the categories ‘primacy of power’, ‘discourses’ and ‘leader images’. We highlight the ability of dominant powers to influence the unfolding of events with material forms of power but also through immaterial ones such as the advancement of a dominant discourse on a cosmopolitan liberal order related to the responsibility-to-protect.
Publisher`s note: The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood needed to manoeuvre underground for several decades, just as most opposition groups in Libya had to—because of the repression from the Qaddafi regime. In 2012, however, the political wing of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), the Justice and Construction Party (JCP, sometimes also called the Justice and Development Party) participated in popular elections just shortly after its inception. Seven years later, one can unanimously say that the movement was not able to take power in the country. This paper will analyse the LMB in post-revolutionary Libya by concentrating on the attempts of establishing legitimacy in the political sphere—while continuously being informed by historical influences. Methodologically, the paper examines primary sources, key academic texts but also factors in interview data from semi-structured interviews. Overall, the paper addresses the puzzle of why Libya as a predominantly Sunni, conservative country did not translate into a conservative Sunni movement like the LMB faring well; with that, derailing the impression that the whole region was "going Islamist" after the so-called Arab Spring. The LMB today is still influenced by the historical treatment it received under Qaddafi, which lead it to base itself mostly in exile, hence it struggled to entrench itself in the country. The LMB was pointed towards their opponents' fearmongering of an alleged Islamist takeover, mostly without addressing self-inflicted wounds, such as their inability to unite or to convince major parts of the population of their political programme.
Publisher`s note: The article interrogates the analytical purchase of the concept of militarism in the case of Libya, and its relationship to securitisation. While Libya is often associated with widely securitised threats to the international order, its military institutions have been viewed with suspicion and ambivalence across different phases of Libyan history, making of Libya an uneasy fit for standard categorisations of militarism. This prompts the question of whether and under what circumstances militarism can occur without and even against the military. Drawing on a historical-sociological analysis, the article shifts the focus to micropolitical dynamics and extra-institutional agency with a view to unpacking the complex entanglement of formal and informal armed actors in Libya’s hybrid security governance. The concepts of informalisation of militarism and militarisation of informality are used as analytical lenses to reconstruct the partial, failed, contested and hijacked attempts to build ‘modern’ military institutions in Libya. I suggest that the repertoire of militarism is not so much an end in itself, but a resource mobilised by local and international actors in a contentious field of state-building practices.
Publisher`s note: This article questions dominant analyses about Libya’s present ‘war economy’ and ‘statelessness’, which are often deployed to explain the country’s ongoing destruction. By reinterpreting the history of the past as the failure of Libya to implement neoliberal reforms, these accounts trivialise its anti-imperialist history. The article reflects on the role that war and militarism play in the US-led imperialist structure, tracing the gradual unmaking of Libya from the progressive revolutionary era, towards its transformation into a comprador state and an outpost for global class war. In doing so, it moves the focus away from Libya’s ‘war economy’ to examine the war and the economy, linking Libya’s fate to the geo-economic and geopolitical forces at the core of US-led imperialism.
Publisher`s note: ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has been a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa. Although it is currently in retreat, it has conquered, controlled, and ruled areas of Syria, Iraq, and Libya. This essay outlines threats posed by ISIS in Libya and in North Africa. The analysis is divided into three sections. The first section takes into account the hybrid military nature of ISIS. The notion of hybrid warfare describes the way in which non-state actors fight: a mix of traditional infantry tactics using modern weapons; guerrilla operations; and terrorism. The second section focuses on Libya. Over the summer of 2014, Libya collapsed into civil war between duelling governments. This turmoil offered ISIS an opening to set up a bridgehead along the Libyan coast. The role of ISIS is analysed in the context of Libyan political and security chaos, underlining both ISIS’s role in the conflict and ISIS’s operations in Sirte. The third section takes into account ISIS’s operations in the North Africa between 2015 and 2016. The group has proved to be resilient; although the loss of its North African capital was a strategic blow, this has not removed ISIS’s ability to execute small-unit raids, and bombings. In conclusion, the paper aims to demonstrate both the hybrid nature of ISIS, which affects various military and political approaches and allows ISIS to withstand classic counterterrorism operations. It also considers ISIS’s ability to operate across borders and to exploit local instability.
Publisher`s note: With the battle for Tripoli, Libya’s civil war has entered a key stage. Powerful outside states are fuelling the conflict, and recent events have raised the prospect of more direct military intervention. No diplomatic solution is foreseeable while the United Nations Security Council’s permanent members support different factions. Moreover, each side in the conflict currently believes it can achieve more through fighting than through the necessary compromises of a peace settlement.
Publisher`s note: This article focuses on the evolution of the European Union–Morocco relationship during the first years of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The aim is to show that Morocco has succeeded in developing a privileged relationship with the EU, taking advantage of the particular institutional characteristics of this period, especially under ENP. Considering the European Union (EU) frequently stresses the importance of democracy and human rights’ progress for justifying the quality of the relationship, the research focuses on these topics. Contrarily to what EU suggests, this research found no evidence of progress in these fields. The research equally points out that the EU evaluations of these elements were lenient towards the objective facts that do not show enough progress to support this type of relationship.
Publisher's note: Mobility partnerships between the European Union (EU) and third countries are usually viewed as reflecting asymmetric power relations where development aid, trade relations and visa policies are made conditional upon the cooperation by third countries with an EU agenda of migration control. Drawing on Cassarino's notion of 'reversed conditionality', this article advocates a more balanced view of EU-third country relations and argues that mobility partnerships are also instrumentalised as part of the domestic agendas of third countries. The argument is illustrated by an analysis of the case of EU-Morocco relations with a specific focus on the National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum in Morocco. The analysis illustrates how soft law instruments such as mobility partnerships have significant legal and political implications for third countries and can provide important external support for the development and implementation of national political priorities.
Publisher's note: The launch in 2013 of a new migration policy marks a major paradigm shift: Morocco henceforth conceives of itself as a country of immigration, no longer only a country of transit. This shift in policy orientation is especially significant because it breaks with the security-based logic of migration management that had prevailed until then. This article examines the emergence and the implementation of these policies from the bottom up. Through the analysis of regularisation operations benefitting some 50,000 illegal migrants, I identify a set of flexibilities, arrangements and extra-regulatory practices adopted by the authorities to reconcile divergent actors’ concerns. This analysis is based on unique fieldwork carried out in 2017 in one of the largest foreigners’ offices created in prefectures for processing regularisation (legalisation) operations. In addition to observation, I conducted 47 interviews with employees of the Moroccan Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Migration Affairs. I also conducted interviews with several representatives of NGOs involved in the regularisation process.
Publisher`s note: In 2013, Morocco announced the adoption of a new, ‘humane’ migration policy. The implementation of the reform, however, has been characterised by an apparent contradiction: while Morocco has leveraged the humanitarian and international orientation of the policy as a foreign policy tool, this new political framework has not so far been translated into law and has been accompanied by persisting violations of migrants’ rights, especially in border areas. Most literature on the topic observes these discrepancies as a sign of the incomplete or ‘indecisive’ character of Moroccan migration policies. Building on the literature on human rights politics and migration policy, in this article we ask instead: what do these contradictions tell us about the trajectory of the Moroccan state, and its relation to the international human rights regime? These discrepancies, we argue, speak to the process of regime hybridisation that has characterised Morocco’s political transition since the 1990s. Morocco’s transition from authoritarianism to a hybrid political regime has been marked by political openings towards liberalism, social mobilisation, and closer engagement with the international human rights framework, which have helped Morocco recraft its international image as a ‘modern’ and ‘stable’ country. These phenomena, however, have coexisted alongside the survival of practices of authoritarian rule. The National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum (SNIA) conforms to Morocco’s formal alignment to the international human rights regime. However, the lack of legal harmonisation grants the state the flexibility to manoeuvre the policy according to its European and African foreign political interests, thus leaving the progress in terms of migrants’ rights vulnerable to sudden setbacks.
Publisher`s note: After 2011, several Arab states initiated decentralisation reforms to address the demonstrators’ demands for more participative governance and more efficient public services. Taking Morocco's new decentralisation reform as a case in point, this article assesses the requirements for, and impediments to, progress. It discovers that the reform articulates important democratic principles and formally opens new spaces of action that may facilitate more efficient and participative governance. However, historical legacies of centralised control, few opportunities for participation, low institutional capacities and weak accountability, and also unclear regulations within the reform, are still hindering effective decentralisation. The potentially positive impact of current reforms on political liberalisation is thus uncertain. Recent uprisings in the Rif region are symptomatic of the neglect of regional inequalities and grievances, and of related dissatisfaction. They also illustrate that increased regional autonomy can only alleviate the structural problems in the longer term and when thoroughly implemented.
Publisher's note: This article argues that Morocco's competitive authoritarian regime is more resilient today in certain key respects than it was when the Arab Spring began. Drawing on Levitsky and Way's dimension of organisational power, the article contends the regime was sufficiently unnerved by the unrest to resort to the use of high intensity coercion as part of its response to the 20 February Movement. The article maintains that, in employing this force successfully, the regime has turned the protests into an important source of non-material cohesion for its security apparatus and thereby enhanced its ability to defend itself from similar challenges in the future.
Publisher`s note: After the ‘Arab Spring’ and the second electoral victory of the Islamist party of Justice and Development in 2016, Moroccan King Mohammed VI had to find new ways to reduce the uncertainty of transparent elections and, as a result, his loss of control over the winner of the House of Representatives elections and the choice of the Head of Government. This profile will analyse a few of the paradoxical implications of the 2011 constitutional reform and the royal narrative for democratic transition, and how these have impacted the political practice of the relevant actors. More precisely, the profile will attempt to clarify the various accommodations by both the King and the political parties, to contextualize the reform and better understand the persistence of authoritarian features despite the democratic hybridization of the Moroccan political system.
Publisher`s note: In the everyday life of Moroccans and at a very symbolic level, each time that the monarch engages in different activities related to various socio-economic fields within the country or in relations to international relations, television viewers are reminded of the centrality of the monarchy in the Moroccan political scene, and of the relative irrelevance of other political actors as well as the weakness of the members of government in strategic matters. During the recent ‘blocage’ that Abdelilah Benkirane was faced with as he was attempting to constitute of the government following the 2016 elections, the activities and travels of the monarch were regularly and widely reported on television and radio. This reporting clearly and symbolically reinforces in the minds of people the importance and dominance of the monarchical institution and hence minimizes the weight and significance of other political actors and the multiplicity of parties that garnish the Moroccan political scene. This article deals with the ‘relevance’ and ‘irrelevance’ of the Moroccan political parties in the context of what I call the Moroccan ‘political theatre’. I argue that the parties are both irrelevant as far political power is concerned but they are simultaneously relevant in terms of sustaining the nature of the political regime in Morocco.
Publisher's note: This article explores the increasing influence of transnational Islamist political networks, and, particularly, the rise of international linkages within Islamist movements that have traditionally had an exclusive national focus. For this purpose, it focuses on Morocco's Islamist opposition movement al-Adl wa-l- Ihsane (AWI), one of whose main mottos is the rejection of financial aid or support from foreign organisations. In spite of this, international issues have contributed to shape its actions within Moroccan borders. Likewise, different Muslim associations inspired by this movement's school of thought have emerged across Europe. In this light, this paper analyses the influence exerted by AWI in three European countries: France, Belgium and Spain, focusing on the different Muslim associations that openly embrace AWI's school of thought. In doing so, it relies on social movement theory to understand the depth and nature of these relations, while reflecting on the impact they have on AWI in Morocco.
Publisher`s note: North Africa has been through significant political and economic changes recently. As the third-largest economy in the region (after Egypt and Algeria), Morocco has emerged as a steadily growing economy with a relatively stable political system which under the current circumstances in the region has the opportunity to become a potentially new regional economic power. This article aims to explore the areas in which the country has already gained dominance over its competitors and the areas in which it still lags behind. The article carries out a comparative analysis of selected key indicators of all North African countries over the last five years (2013–2017). The results show that Morocco began dominating the region mainly in foreign direct investment outflows and the export of services. In other areas, it still lags behind, but the rate of recent changes urges scholars to follow its development more closely, as the country may be a newly-rising regional economic power.
Publisher`s note: In January 2017 at the 28th African Union (AU) Summit held in Addis Ababa, King Mohammed VI made a historic speech which made headlines in numerous African newspapers. Addressing heads of African States, the Moroccan monarch announced that the return of Morocco to its African fold was an inevitable course given the historical ties and strong political and economic interests that have always united his country with the African continent. Amid the warm welcome of the majority of African member states, the king outlined his “vision of South-South cooperation” insisting that it was time for African political elites to recognize their strengths and potentials, and empower their own political, judicial and economic institutions to face the enduring challenges of development and political stability.
Publisher's note: The existing literature on state-building has focused mainly on post-conflict cases and ‘conventional’ examples of statehood, without taking into consideration the particularities of states that remain internally and/or externally contested. The EU’s engagement in Palestinian state-building through the deployment of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah has generated various types of unintended consequences: anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative, desirable and undesirable, some of which fulfill and some of which frustrate the initial intention. These have important reverberations for the EU’s conflict resolution strategies in Israel and Palestine, the most important being the strengthening of power imbalances and the enforcement of the status quo.
Publisher`s note: Perception research can make a valuable contribution to the study of the local dimension in EU peacebuilding. The conceptual framework developed in this article distinguishes between perceptions of the “legitimacy,” “effectiveness,” and “credibility” of EU peacebuilding practices, which are crucial factors for successful peacebuilding. Relying on the case of the EU’s support for security sector reform (SSR) in Palestine, this article shows that local stakeholders— which participate in various EU-sponsored training and capacity-building programs—display considerable support for liberal peacebuilding norms. Yet, perceived discrepancies between the EU’s peacebuilding rhetoric and its SSR activities have severely undermined the potential of the EU’s liberal peacebuilding model in the eyes of Palestinian stakeholders. Critical local perceptions are frequently articulated with reference to the EU’s own liberal peacebuilding discourse, pointing to a lack of inclusiveness of the SSR process and deficits in terms of democratic governance and the rule of law.
Publisher`s note: This paper examines the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) with a focus on its effects on everyday police work on the ground. The main argument is that the mission illustrates the ways in which its training and advisory activities work to foster logics and practices that feed into and reproduce the borders that have over the years been imposed, primarily through Israeli security practices. Operating under conditions of 'contested statehood', EUPOL COPPS promotes Palestinian policing activities based on particular spatial logics and actions as to the governance of the Palestinian population. The article presents new empirical material collected through interviews and document analysis. As such, it aims to build bridges between the literature on critical border studies, EU external relations, the EU’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the literature on the EU police missions in conflict and post-conflict missions by emphasizing their spatial dimension.
Publisher's note: This article triangulates a mix of elite interviews, media content-analysis and an original Q-sort public opinion methodology to map the presence of narratives about EU relations among young Israelis and Palestinians. We aim to identify the narrative “terrain” or conditions that the EU communicates to and with and, drawing on feminist and everyday narrative studies, to examine the role of affect and identity to explain why some narratives are more “sticky” than others in those societies. We find a broad recognition that the EU’s capacity to act in international relations is necessary but limited in the face of greater challenges in the international system, and indeed, within the EU itself.
Publisher`s note: Recent years have seen a revitalisation of decolonisation as a framework of analysis in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This article maps changes in the meanings attached to decolonisation in the Israeli Israeli–Palestinian context, paying particular attention to the one-state paradigm. One-state proposals highlight bi-national realities in historic Palestine in order to lay out a decolonising vision grounded in equal civic rights. Many one-state advocates, however, are suspicious of a prescriptive bi-national paradigm that would afford the two national groups equal collective rights, primarily because its recognition of Jewish national self-determination is seen as entrenching, rather than decolonising, colonial relations of power. We argue that a prescriptive bi-nationalism in fact offers rich resources for a decolonising project in Israel/Palestine that seeks to establish a polity based on the principles of justice and equality – come to terms with historical injustice and imagine alternative pasts, presents and futures based on Arab–Jewish relationships.
Publisher`s note: This article examines foreign aid and government funding to NGOs as forms of patronage and explores the impact of such funding on the nature and role of civil society. Using qualitative research from Palestine and Morocco, we argue that patronage transforms NGOs into apparatuses of governing. NGOs become key sites for the exercise of productive power through the technologies of professionalization, bureaucratization, and upward accountability. The article explores how this transformation of NGOs depoliticizes their work while undermining their role as change agents within civil society. The findings have implications for understanding the transformation of NGOs, the relationship between patrons and their grantees, and, finally, for exploring the limitations of NGOs as vehicles for social change in sensitive political environments.
Publisher`s note: The article focuses on the challenges faced by Palestine authority during the crisis. Topics discussed the crisis that includes both political and economic ramifications, highlights the role of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) in the development process, and information on the decisions to boycott the American administration and rejection of all resolutions, and information on the ending of harmony between the new American and Israeli positions.
Publisher`s note: In the context of Syria’s displacement, supranational ‘migration governors’ in the Arab region have sought – in different forms and capacities – to devise initiatives for responsibility sharing and to reinforce the capacity of Syria’s Arab neighbours to deal with refugee inflows. While the case of Syria’s displacement has witnessed the proliferation of collaborative networks, institutional complexity has yielded low effectiveness for the governance of such large-scale displacement in Syria’s neighbourhood. Supranational bodies have formulated dissonant frameworks and agendas. In the context of securitised responses to displacement, the discourse has not reflected the realities of refugee assistance and protection. Multi-level policy frameworks need to be embedded in the region’s geopolitical field of migration governance and refugee protection. While colliding policy arenas are to be grounded within the region’s historical trajectory of migration politics, an understanding of their effects requires gaining an insight into how they have interacted with the various refugee-hosting Arab states, influenced their refugee discourse, and impacted the issue of refugee assistance and protection on the ground.
Publisher`s note: The Syrian civil war – which has largely ended following bloody 8 years – serves as a prime case study of mechanisms which challenge border realities, as well as geography and demography, through engagement of manifold internal and external actors. This article discusses these processes and their implications by focusing on the Syro-Israeli borderland. It analyses the main actors and their motives, geography of interactions, as well as implications for humanitarian situation and security considerations. It is argued that while the dynamics in the Syro-Israeli borderland have several unique characteristics, they also point to a broader process of re-drawing borderlands and lines of influence in the Middle East region.
Publisher`s note: This article assesses the impact of the Assad regime’s aerial bombardment campaign on a frequently neglected component of Syria’s ongoing civil war: rebel governance. While analysis of the military and humanitarian ramifications of such attacks has been extensive, these perspectives fail to consider how the Assad regime’s counter insurgency efforts subvert governance practices by Syria’s diverse rebel groups. Drawing on performative approaches to the ‘state’, we argue that opposition groups’ daily enactments of ‘stateness’ via two key welfare services – bread and healthcare provision – constitute a historically inflected and locally grounded critique of the incumbent. When executed successfully, such enactments can stabilize relations between rulers and ruled while offering a vision of an alternative polity. They can also attract the attention of rivals. The Assad regime’s aerial bombing campaign of rebel-held areas is thus neither a haphazard military strategy nor simply the product of long-standing sectarian hatreds, but a deliberate tactic through which it seeks to destroy a key threat to its authority.
Publisher`s note: The 2011 Syrian uprising saw the rise of several Syrian diaspora organizations seeking transitional justice (TJ). In this article, we ask why these organizations have been unable to present a coherent and unified TJ agenda. We show how a sequence of mechanisms (transnational brokerage, vertical coordination, and patronage relations) have led to fragmentation in the pursuit of justice. The analysis is divided into two sections. First, we discuss the onset of patronage relations made possible by brokered alliances and vertical coordination. Fuelled by differing conceptions of justice and confidence that the regime would quickly fall, organizations proliferated and fragmented. Second, we show how the entrenchment of patronage relations has largely precluded horizontal coordination, even as groups shifted strategy in the wake of changing conditions in Syria. We then argue that collaborative efforts among diaspora groups have largely failed to overcome the rigid patronage relations established early in the mobilization phase.
Publisher`s note: The Syrian conflict is a very complex war that draws the entire world’s attention. Understanding the Syrian war is not easy because it is not a conventional war between two visible enemies. The on-going civil war in Syria arose first internally as a civil war in the wake of the Arab Spring and became a multisided complex war with many external actors and motives involved. However, in every kind of hostility, it is always the civilians who suffer greatest losses. In order to prevent such disastrous wars in the future, it is important to understand the basic underlying reasons that paved the way for the Syrian crises. This article analyzes the Syrian crises through two lenses, an inside-out and an outside-in approach, to determine which is the more important to focus on to improve the Syrian situation and to prevent such chaos elsewhere in the future.
Publisher`s note: Studies of conflict management by international organizations have demonstrated correlations between institutional characteristics and outcomes, but questions remain as to whether these correlations have causal properties. To examine how institutional characteristics condition the nature of international organization interventions, I examine mediation and ceasefire monitoring by the Arab League and the United Nations during the first phase of the Syrian civil war (2011–2012). Using micro-evidence sourced from unique interview material, day-to-day fatality statistics, and international organization documentation, I detail causal pathways from organizational characteristics, via intervention strategies, to intervention outcomes. I find that both international organizations relied on comparable intervention strategies. While mediating, they counseled on the costs of conflict, provided coordination points, and managed the bargaining context so as to sideline spoilers and generate leverage. While monitoring, they verified violent events, engaged in reassurance patrols, and brokered local truces. The execution of these strategies was conditioned on organizational capabilities and member state preferences in ways that help explain both variation in short-term conflict abatement and the long-term failure of both international organizations. In contrast to the Arab League, the United Nations intervention, supported by more expansive resources and expertise, temporarily shifted conflict parties away from a violent equilibrium. Both organizations ultimately failed as disunity among international organization member state principals cut interventions short and reduced the credibility of international organization mediators.
Publisher`s note: This study analyzes the key attributions of the Assad regime’s failure to end the protracted Syrian Civil War. It analyzes why it has taken the Assad regime so long to win back most of its territory despite tremendous support from Iran and Russia against fragmented oppositions who received jaded, half-hearted Western assistance. The article adopts a corpus-based, thematic analysis approach and uses primary and predominantly secondary data to examine Syrian domestic politics, as well as regional and global geopolitics. It explores how the three main geopolitically related themes contribute to the state of Syria as of mid-2018. The findings point toward several issues, including the regime’s dire manpower shortage, a severe lack of economic and social wherewithal, and Assad’s hard, inflexible stance on negotiations in addition to his corruption and brutality, which are among the key reasons for the current state of the Syrian conflict.
Publisher`s note: This paper analyses the Syrian conflict since 2011 in the context of the larger Middle East, focusing on local, regional and global actors. The first section highlights some geopolitical and historical factors regarding Syria. The second part outlines post-Cold War US and Israeli strategic debates on Syria and the Middle East. It is argued that US policy in the Syrian conflict since 2011 underlines the continuing significance of US-led regime change agendas as initially associated with the so-called “neoconservatives” and near unconditional US backing of Israel’s regional strategic objectives. The third section examines how local conflicts in Syria, since mid-March 2011, became transformed into a lengthy global war over world order during which the US challenged Russia’s long-standing geopolitical patronage of Syria’s political leadership. The interaction between military and political factors and the manner in which the “crisis narrative” was managed in the Western media system is also sketched. Finally, the fourth section focuses on the theory of “peripheral realism” and offers a discussion of this theory’s concept of state hierarchy applied to the Middle Eastern context. It is suggested that the war in Syria serves to destroy the existing regional state hierarchy and regional states’ potential capacity for upward mobility in the global state system.
Publisher's note: Partnerships between organisations in humanitarian crisis situations generally are challenging, but at the apex are those established as part of remote management in a context of extreme insecurity. To date, little systematic research has been conducted on arrangements between local organisations that have access to crisis‐affected populations and international organisations that hold the purse strings. This paper presents the findings of nine months of qualitative research conducted with five Syrian local organisations and their international partners engaging in humanitarian action across the Turkey–Syria border, and presents insights into the components of successful partnerships. It redefines capacity along organisational and operational lines, and unpacks how monitoring and evaluation and donor requirements create tension and, at times, place local organisations at risk. The paper highlights the centrality of trust in successful partnerships, and describes the personalisation of the conflict by local organisations. Based on a historical case study of civil society in northern Iraq, it closes with some suggestions for long‐term sustainability.
Publisher's note: The EU now needs to innovate policies towards the Middle East. The disastrous consequences of the military intervention in Libya are for all practical purposes a European mistake. The air campaign was originally a French initiative with Norway taking a lead role. By the perception of failure, it most likely caused inaction towards the regime in Syria. Only a concert of the regional states can create a new regional political order, and an innovative EU policy needs to engage these states for this purpose. A regional concert is the yet untried option in Western policy towards the Middle East. An effective EU diplomacy is to engage parties in envisioning an alternative regional political order by the analogy of European transformation from violent confrontation to pragmatic cooperation.
Publisher`s note: Tunisia is the only Arab Spring country that has been able to manage peaceful regime change. Western know-how support and financial assistance have been crucial in this process. However, while often celebrated for its liberal achievements, Tunisia’s young democracy is still fragile and faces the imminent risk of sliding back towards authoritarian tendencies. Multiple terrorist attacks in 2015 have triggered an atmosphere of securitization. The fight against extremism has legitimized the curtailment of newly gained democratic rights and the return of the practices of the national security state of the Ben Ali era. President Essebsi has used the fight against extremism as an excuse to expand his prerogatives at the expense of parliament and independent bodies. Moreover, the government’s counterterrorism policies have also diverted large amounts of the country’s budget away from the fight against poverty and youth unemployment, to military armament and surveillance technologies. Instead of addressing pressing socio-economic issues, the government’s policies have rather securitized ‘problematic’, disenfranchised social groups. Western criticism of Tunisia’s strategies against extremism has been scarce. After all, many of the government’s measures have corresponded to Western security interests. Considering that the threat of terrorism is likely to continue, there is a serious risk that the exceptional measures taken in the name of counterterrorism will become a default technique of governing. The profile article warns that instead of being consolidated, Tunisia’s transition may end up in a political grey zone somewhere between a democracy and authoritarianism.
Publisher`s note: The year 2020 is proving to be another trying one for Tunisia's barely decade-old democracy. Following parliamentary and presidential elections in September and October 2019—the fourth and fifth national votes held since dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fell in 2011—new president Kaïs Saïed and the unicameral 217-member national assembly face the task of consolidating democratic institutions despite economic crisis, rampant corruption, growing social and identity tensions, and widespread political estrangement. The Jasmine Revolution that began with Ben Ali's flight into exile was able to succeed initially thanks to a deal or "pact" among his disparate opponents and lingering elements of his power structure. But it is proving very hard to move beyond that first, hard-won agreement and the consensus-based power-sharing system that it produced.
Publisher`s note: The article analyzes how crimmigration law, combined with a range of illegal practices employed by the Tunisian authorities, negatively impacts on the human rights of irregular migrants, in particular asylum seekers, in Tunisia. By placing Tunisia’s migration policy within the broader EU strategy of externalizing migration controls, the article shows how the EU supports, and relies on, Tunisia’s systemic violations of human rights in order to prevent irregular migrants from reaching the EU.The central part of the article is divided in four sections, with each section examining the impact of Tunisia’s migration policy on a specific human right. The first section analyzes how legislation criminalizing irregular migration and migration-related activities, together with illegal practices used by Tunisian security forces (e.g., pushing back irregular migrants at Tunisian borders, detaining irregular migrants in order to prevent them from making asylum claims), deprive irregular migrants of their right to seek asylum. The second section examines how practices adopted by Tunisian security forces (e.g., refusing to allow irregular migrants to have access to lawyers and interpreters) undermine the right to due process in both criminal proceedings and proceedings for protection status determination. The third section argues that measures adopted by the Tunisian authorities (e.g., preventing refugees with protection status from obtaining residency permits) violate the refugees’ right to work, while the fourth section analyzes how the criminalization of irregular departure from Tunisia violates the right to leave a country, including one’s own country.
Publisher's note: The article moves beyond the debate about the continuity and change in EU policy-making towards post-uprisings North Africa to explain the way in which the relationship evolved in the case of functional areas and notably security cooperation. It argues that persistence in the EU’s approach did not necessarily entail continuity in EU-Tunisia and EU-Morocco interactions on security. It is often assumed that the relationship is unidirectional and that target countries can simply choose either acquiescence or resistance. The post-uprising reality shows that domestic events in Tunisia and Morocco had an impact on how they approached the EU and how, in turn, the EU reacted to them. There is therefore what can be called a feedback loop that makes relationships more complex and ‘individualized’ than previously assumed.
Publisher's note: Building on empirical qualitative material, this article argues that the international promotion of democracy is crucial to account for Tunisia’s positive transitional outcome. Specifically, the study sheds new light on the capacity of international democracy promoters (IDPs) to enhance competitive politics and contribute to the professionalization of political parties and civil society groups during Tunisia’s post-revolutionary path. The article also offers two research avenues for reviewing the negative standing on international democratic promotion in the MENA region. First it argues that promotion of democracy in transitions away from authoritarianism is more likely to succeed when a wide spectrum of transitional elites agrees upon the political system to establish and they do not enter into conflicts on how to collaborate with the IDPs. Second, it emphasizes that during a transitional period, structured and strategic partnerships between IDPs and transitional elites enable fragile societies to sustain their democratic process if internal and external antisystemic interventions do not place obstacles in the path of this interplay.
Publisher`s note: Since the 1990s, comparative scholars and constructivists have recognized the universally liberal character of democracy promotion and yet continued the analysis of difference in this area. Mainly in studies of German and US democracy promotion, constructivists have demonstrated the recurring and difference-generating impact of ideational factors. In this article, I hence assume the likeliness of difference and address the question of how we can analyse and explain those differences through a comparison of German and US democracy assistance in transitional Tunisia. I conceive of Germany and the US as a dissimilar pair and adopt a broad perspective to uncover differences at the diplomatic level and between and within the respective approaches to democracy assistance in Tunisia. Theoretically, I argue that national role conceptions hardly impact democracy assistance in a clear manner, and that roles are renegotiated in the process. I rather focus on liberal and reform liberal conceptions of democracy, which shape perceptions of the local context, and democracy assistance agencies different organizational cultures, which impact civil society support. Finally, I account for transnational dialogue and coordination as a factor mitigating differences in democracy promotion.
Publisher's note: This article argues that the new EU's selective engagement with Islamist parties in its Southern neighbourhood following the Arab uprisings is the result of a partial shift in the EU's frame used to understand political Islam, combined with a form of pragmatism that puts a premium on finding interlocutors in the region. Using the case studies of Tunisia and Egypt, it shows that the EU has replaced its previous monolithic conception of political Islam with an understanding that is more sensitive to differences among Islamists. This opens the door to some forms of engagement with those actors that renounce violence and demonstrate their commitment to work within the confines of democratic rules, while violent strands of political Islam and conservative groups remain at arm's length.
Publisher`s note: The author explores the divergent political trajectories pursued by Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. She argues that factors such as socio-economic development, mass culture, and prior regime character were less consequential in shaping the chances of democratic transition than were factors such as civil society, the character of the military, and leadership.
Publisher's note: In post—2011 Tunisia, the reform of the security sector has proceeded haphazardly, hindering security efficiency and lowering the overall effectiveness in countering threats. Since 2015, the combination of three factors — external shocks, international actors' pressures and domestic configurations of political power — have paved the way for a progressive overhaul of the efficiency of security agencies. Following the 2015 terrorist attacks, that destabilized the political system and risked derailing the trajectory of democratic consolidation, European powers exerted pressure to improve efficiency in the security sector. Lastly, these push factors needed an enabling condition, a strong presidency of the republic, to make the changes happen. The measures adopted reflect a technical and supposedly depoliticized view of reforms, in line with a broader post‐interventionist trend in Security Assistance. Based on process-tracing, the analysis of primary documents and several in‐depth interviews carried out between 2015 and 2017, the article illustrates the workings of the policy process in the security arena. It sheds light on the conditions that made possible the adoption of reforms, the role external actors played in pushing for change and in creating a new multilateral mechanism, the G7+, which produced an unintended set of domestic consequences.
If you are unable to access the article you need, please contact us and we will get it for you as soon as possible.
| Data Protection Notice | Cookie Policy & Inventory |
 |
 |
 |
Journals on all devices |
Books, articles, EPRS publications & more |
Newspapers on all devices |