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Abstract by the author: The Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 has caused significant disruption to global agricultural markets. As Ukraine is the world's ninth largest producer and fifth largest exporter of wheat, the widespread, destructive effects of the war have serious implications for food prices and global food security. We analyze the impacts of this war on production, consumption, trade, and prices of wheat using a global spatial equilibrium model (SEM). Our results suggest that this conflict causes wheat prices to increase in every country (by around 2%) except Ukraine where prices fell by about 27%. Though other wheat exporting countries augment their exports to capture the market share lost by Ukraine in major importing countries, many of these importing countries suffer from reduced wheat consumption. Not surprisingly, Russia benefits by exporting wheat at the expense of Ukraine to importing countries that traditionally relied on Ukrainian wheat. Because of the war, we estimate that Ukraine's wheat producers experience a $1.4 billion loss in producer surplus.
Abstract by the authors: The unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 is imposing a terrible human cost. In this paper, we use the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) to quantify the impact of the war on the global economy. The war represents a massive cost, equivalent to 1% of global GDP in 2022, or about $1.5 trillion valued at purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP), compared with our GDP forecast made at the beginning of 2022. Europe is the region affected most, given trade links its proximity to Ukraine and Russia and its reliance on energy and food supplies from those countries. GDP in Europe is expected to shrink by more than 1% in 2022 compared with our forecast at the beginning of 2022. In Western Europe, Germany will be worst affected, followed by France and Italy. GDP in ‘Developing Europe’, where Ukraine is the largest representative, is expected to shrink by 30%. The war will also add about 2% to global inflation in 2022 and 1% in 2023, compared with NIESR's inflation projection at the beginning of 2022.
Abstract by the author: This paper uses a product-level empirical model of bilateral trade to examine the global trade implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The results show that imports from Ukraine were 47.3% below the counterfactual between February and August 2022. The Russia–Ukraine war led to significant trade diversion for Russia, primarily benefiting Russian mineral oil and gas exports to Europe and Asia. The analysis also reveals that the trade adjustments operate mainly through import price hikes, with notable heterogeneity across product groups and regions. The findings indicate that the Ukraine–Russia war had significant trade implications for Ukraine and Russia but only limited ones for other countries.
Abstract by the authors: This article reviews the literature on the multifaceted consequences of historical conflict. We revisit three key topics, which are especially relevant for the current Ukrainian context. (1) The negative long-term impact of bombing campaigns and political repression against civilians. (2) The interplay between forced migration, refugees and war. (3) The role of gender and war, with a special focus on sex ratios and conflict-related sexual violence. We conclude with an empirical investigation of the Russian war against Ukraine, including aforementioned historical determinants such as ethnic populations, historical political repression and voting outcomes.
Abstract by the authors: Using stock returns from a sample of 94 countries over the period from 22 January to 24 March 2022, we document a negative relationship between the Ukraine–Russia war and world stock market returns. We thus provide the first empirical evidence. •We provide the first empirical evidence of the effect of the Ukraine–Russia war on world stock market returns. The war has negatively impacted the world’s stock indices and this effect was more significant after the invasion of Ukraine. The countries bordering Ukraine and Russia were the most affected, as were the UN countries that condemned the war.
Abstract by the authors: We evaluate the transmission of returns and volatility in the universe of commodities around the war in Ukraine. The total volatility spillover increases from 35% to 85%, exceeding the level seen during the pandemic. The role of commodities changes in both return and volatility spillover systems. Crude oil becomes a net transmitter of return spillovers whereas wheat and soybeans become net receivers of return spillovers. Silver, gold, copper, platinum, aluminium, and sugar become net transmitters of volatility. Geopolitical risk Granger causes the spillover indices. High levels of return and volatility spillovers are associated with high levels of geopolitical risk.
Abstract by the author: This paper intends to establish conceptual foundations for analyzing the economic dimensions of a territorial military conflict. The Intraregional Trade Disruption from War Simulator (ITDW-Simulator) attempts to estimate the heterogeneous macroeconomic effects of the military conflict. The model suggests two primary indicators and four secondary indicators. The final trade suffocation index (TS-Index) and the final investment desgrowth from war function (−δw) measure trade disruption’s potential impact on international trade patterns and economic development. The agriculture exports, industrial and manufacturing exports, service exports, and FDI flows capture the trade and investment interdependency. The model investigates the impact of the Russo-Ukraine military conflict on the bilateral trade and investment between the Russian Federation and the European Union.
Abstract by the author: The Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the most flagrant violations of international law in recent times. The Russian action has received global condemnation with various countries imposing sanctions on Russia. This article argues that concerning imposing trade sanctions against Russia, countries can rely on the national security exception in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The relevant legal provision in this regard is Article XXI of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The article undertakes a doctrinal analysis of GATT’s Article XXI. This analysis is conducted in the light of two WTO disputes—the Russia: Transit case and the Saudi Arabia: Intellectual Property case—that have interpreted the national security exception. The article argues that while the national security exception given in GATT’s Article XXI is not self-judging, countries will enjoy deference in determining their essential security interests. The article then applies this doctrinal understanding to the current Russia–Ukraine war. The current situation will fall under Article XXI, and countries can impose trade-restricting measures against Russia (such as suspension of the most-favoured-nation treatment) following Article XXI of GATT.
Abstract by the author: Companies and countries have needed to adapt their activities to the consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine. The analysis in this article shows that both the Russian war in Ukraine and the subsequent trade restrictions have become a powerful trigger, significantly increasing the level of inflation and exacerbating the existing issues of economies. As a result, the confrontation between the West and Russia has greatly escalated, which will have a long-term, large-scale negative impact on most European companies and economies. There could also be a lasting restructuring of world trade. The article notes that not only the end date of the war in Ukraine may be important for business and economies, but also which of the trade and financial restrictions can be lifted from Russia, and when. The article also makes recommendations that may help company leaders plan, in a timelier and more accurate fashion, the changes necessary to maintain company sustainability.
Abstract by the authors: The following is an edited transcript of the 108th in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The event took place on April 22, 2022, via Zoom, with Council Executive Director Bassima Alghussein moderating.
Abstract by the author: The EU and Africa’s African Union held their sixth summit on 17-18 February 2022: a week later Russia invaded the Ukraine. In the short-term, European focus shifted from Africa but increasingly EU officials and member states are looking towards Africa. The EU seeks to step up cooperation with some African countries to help replace imports of Russian natural gas and reduce dependence on Moscowby almost two-thirds in 2022. The EU has also revised its list of critical minerals, which it is members seek to guarantee supply chains. This article assesses the evolution of EU-Africa relations, particularly since December 2007 with the launch of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The EU’s Africa focus is increasingly more strategic, and coherent, this is still not the case for Africa whose common interests towards Europe remain fragmented although the launch of the continental African Free Continental Trade Area (AfCTA) is a positive development. Looking forward it will be reinvigorated trade and investment that needs to become the heart of Africa-EU relations if this partnership is to prosper – not security, aid and counter migration that has framed past EU focus.
Abstract by the author: This paper discusses the way the European Union (EU) needs to adapt its economic diplomacy toolbox to tackle current challenges pertaining to the Russian war on Ukraine. It investigates the way in which the EU has developed its economic diplomacy in Ukraine, focusing on the scope of this diplomacy and its efficacy in responding to Russia's assertiveness and, ultimately, to Russia's aggression. The research identifies those initiatives that may be part of the priority toolkit used for sustaining the EU's strategic goals in Ukraine and beyond, considering the evolving global economic environment. The paper concludes with a comprehensive listing of the EU's challenges and opportunities for further developing its economic diplomacy, including as a solution or a response to the Ukrainian reconstruction needs.
Abstract by the author: The European Union's (EU) external governance enjoys significant attention in the literature. Yet its outcomes are usually assessed with reference to strategic documents or scholars' self-designed criteria. This article contributes to the ongoing debate with a discourse analysis focusing on the perceptions of anti-corruption reform outcomes in Ukraine by actors on different levels in the EU. Simultaneously, structural factors are incorporated into the analysis. It demonstrates that although constant progress is officially proclaimed by the EU, even technical advisers disagree on how success in this crucial domain is understood and how to measure it. High-level representatives face a balancing act between conditionality demands, sovereignty limitations and geopolitical considerations. This explains the official signalling by the EU and the development of its rule-of-law reform conditionality. The outcome is a potential state of moral hazard and raise the question whether EU external governance has not become a victim of its ‘own success’.
Abstract by the author: This paper looks at the way the European Union has shifted its policymaking process to adapt to the crisis situation in Ukraine and how this serves the EUs goal of increasing its geopolitical power, becoming a global geopolitical actor. Looking at the specific geopolitical dimensions, the paper argues that the EU has upgraded its geopolitical posture, through cohesive policies taken against the aggressor. Following close monitoring of the EU working sessions and the flow of news, and considering focused interviews on the future of the EU, given the current events, this research brings forth two main scenarios for the EU, commenting on the potential risks for the blocs unity considering the Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond.
Abstract by the author: This article analyses the evolving nature of the strategic relationship between Ukraine and the EU since the onset of the second decade of the 21st century. The author aims to show that, although the two sides have for years been elevating their ties through the neighbourhood policy and the Eastern Partnership strategic initiative, Kyiv's ultimate ambition has always been focused on securing the EU membership perspective. The author considers the Ukrainian EU membership request precarious due to the Union's concerns over stability, Kyiv's territorial integrity problems and the ongoing war, the unfavourable impact for the current membership candidates, but also since such a request sets a precedent for the other eastern partners. To explicate the abovementioned aspects, the author primarily uses the historical method and the document analysis, to clarify in greater detail the chief political events which have gradually led towards the current state. Research conclusions point out that, despite Ukraine's right to apply for EU membership, such a request is unlikely to result in a speedy accession, due to a variety of abovementioned aspects, coupled with a complicated decision-making process in the Union in that regard. In spite of that, the EU intends to continue supporting Ukraine as a strategic partner in a variety of domains, including also an indirect aid in combating the Russian military incursion. The author finds that the EU?s response to the membership application will have extensive ramifications not only on the two parties? relations, but also on the enlargement policy and the Eastern Partnership domain.
Abstract by the author: Why did transatlantic policymakers target Russia with economic sanctions in response to its actions during the Ukraine conflict? Commentators perceived these sanctions as highly unlikely because they would have high costs for several European countries, and were surprised when they were finally adopted. Constructivist scholars employed explanations based on common norms and trust to explain the European Union’s agreement on economic sanctions in this case. I argue that the mechanism of international emotional resonance played a decisive role in altering the course of the United States and core European Union powers’ cooperation. A framework that combines resonance with emotional influence mechanisms of persuasion and contagion explains the precise timing of the policy shift, why European policymakers accepted sanctions at a substantial cost to their economy and how norms affected policy when they were empowered by intense emotions.
Abstract by the author: Este artículo analiza las sanciones internacionales impuestas a Rusia por parte de la UE como consecuencia de la anexión de Crimea y el conflicto en el Donbás, así como su impacto en términos políticos y económicos en los estados miembros, en determinados sectores económicos y sobre Rusia. Asimismo, aborda cómo la diversidad de posiciones en el seno del Consejo Europeo afecta al proceso de toma de decisiones en esta materia, donde cada vez más se hacen oír voces críticas contra estas medidas. El estudio se desarrolla sobre postulados normativos que se trasladarán al caso específico para observar el comportamiento de los actores involucrados y las distintas reacciones que se van dando a lo largo del tiempo, entre ellas la de España. Así, quiere ser una contribución a la literatura académica en materia de sanciones internacionales aplicando a este caso de estudio específico las tipologías de sanciones existentes.
Abstract by the authors: Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has upended Europe's security order, with many observers calling it a turning point for the European Union. This article contends, however, that the EU's response has been less a turning point and more of an epiphany, providing a reality check for the EU and its member states about how far European foreign policy cooperation has evolved in recent decades. It suggests that an understanding of the EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine requires consideration of the member states' foreign policy co-operation, which has intensified over the past half-century, and its underpinning norm which we term a ‘collective European responsibility to act’. In emphasizing this norm, we identify core ideas about the functioning of collective European foreign policy. We re-examine three key preoccupations of the EU foreign policy-making practice and assessment through the lens of the collective European responsibility to act and show how it enables a different and novel re-reading of the added value of EU foreign policy cooperation. The EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine thus serves as a timely focusing event that demands a rethink of the premises that have underpinned our analysis and understanding of collective European foreign policy-making over decades.
Abstract by the authors: The Russian–Ukrainian war is transforming world institutions, including NATO. The partnership and cooperative security policy, enshrined in NATO’s previous concept, was defined by a sustainable world order and international law. The war in Ukraine demonstrated the incompetence of major world security institutions and defined the challenges of their rapid transformation to effective reformatting. NATO, which has a new format for the organization’s development after the Ramstein meeting on April 26, 2022, actively joined this process. At the same time, the contemporary resolution of war and peace issues requires a transition from the concept of “peace agenda” to that of peace engineering. NATO’s peacemaking capabilities in resetting the interaction and transformation of U.N. peacekeeping determine the transition from nonsystemic peacemaking activities to the formation of a peace engineering program environment, which consists of the political-military, diplomatic, political and economic, logistical, social and humanitarian, and environmental and technogenic environments.
Abstract by the author: At the heart of this conflict of Ukraine war is the American threat to break Russia into multiple states; alongside the Russian threat to create a new global trading currency with China as equal partners. These two contrary themes find themselves in mortal conflict in the land of Ukraine. The argument is that this bigger picture of this war explains why both sides are likely to fight to the end. Neither think that they can concede.
Abstract by the author: In this essay, I discuss some of the dominant ways of reasoning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. First, I examine the duality of the contemporary geopolitical condition, and the ways in which the invasion is understood to challenge the global liberalist project premised on economic competition rather than territorial contestation. Second, I briefly scrutinize the realist mode of explaining and understanding the Russian invasion and its problematic tenets from the perspective of small states. I argue that the liberalist and realist framings of world politics are, at their heart, reasonably similar. Both share and articulate a belief that there is a coherent geopolitical global order, and that it is the duty of powerful states to maintain and enforce that order.
Abstract by the author: Im Konflikt um die Ukraine treffen postimperiale Nachwehen nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion, russischer Neoimperialismus, geopolitisches Tauziehen um das europäische Herzland und US-Strategie zur Konsolidierung der erodierenden Pax Americana mittels eines möglichst tiefen Grabens quer durch Europa aufeinander. Es besteht kein Anlass, auch nur einen der treibenden Akteure sympathisch zu finden oder seine Motive zu beschönigen. Auch die Frage, ob die elektorale Despotie in Russland oder die Oligarchenherrschaft in der Ukraine näher an unseren freiheitlich-demokratischen Werten liegen oder den Lebensinteressen der Menschen vor Ort dienlicher sind, gehört eher zur propagandistischen Begleitmusik. Außer Zweifel steht, dass der Konflikt um die Ukraine geeignet ist, die europäische Friedensordnung fundamental zu erschüttern, die letzten Reste gemeinsamer Sicherheit zu begraben und eine dauerhafte Periode offen feindlicher Konfrontation einzuläuten, immer gefährlich knapp am ultimativen Gewaltausbruch
Abstract by the author: Am 24. August 2021 feierte man in Kiew den 30. Jahrestag der Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine. Einen Tag zuvor waren dort auf Einladung des Staatspräsidenten Wolodymyr Selenskyj circa 40 Staatschefs, Minister und Botschafter zusammengekommen, um auf einer Konferenz den Anspruch auf die im Frühjahr 2014 von Russland annektierte Halbinsel Krim zu bekräftigen und hierfür internationale Hilfe einzufordern. Der vom ukrainischen Staatspräsidenten in Szene gesetzte Vorgang entbehrte nicht einer gewissen Komik, ist aber verständlich, wenn man den früheren Beruf Selenskyjs bedenkt. Realismus zwingt uns jedoch zu erkennen, dass die internationale Politik nicht losgelöst von den historischen Fakten und den gegebenen Machtverhältnissen betrachtet werden sollte.
Abstract by the authors: Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has opened up an opportunity for the United States to assert international leadership once again and even recapture some trappings of hegemony, which have been eroded in recent years. As the war has upended the old international order, the Biden administration is facing questions regarding the future direction of America’s global engagement in the “post-February 24, 2022” world. This article zooms in on five sets of challenges that the U.S. needs to deal with if it wants to sustain the “hegemonic moment” brought about by the war in Ukraine. Without attention and resolve to mitigate these challenges, the re-emergence of U.S. leadership in the transatlantic domain, not to mention any visions of reasserting U.S. hegemony more broadly, may prove but a flash in the pan.
Abstract by the author: Germany's recent Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) has become a major topic in Western discussions about how to deal best with Vladimir Putin's Russia. This essay proceeds from Interdependence Theory to argue that the Berlin-promoted Nord Stream gas pipeline projects are loosening Russian-Ukrainian economic ties, and thereby easing conflict between the two post-Soviet states. Ukraine's surprisingly peaceful development during its first 20 years as an independent state is contrasted with the escalation of tensions between Moscow and Kyiv in 2013–2014. The completion of the first Nord Stream pipe in October 2012 is seen as a crucial development that untied the Kremlin's hand vis-à-vis Ukraine. The lowering of Moscow's dependence on the Ukrainian gas transportation system, due to the new Baltic Sea pipeline, eventually led to a territorial conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
Abstract by the author: None of the three revolutions in Ukraine's modern history as an independent state has been able to both solve the problem of political representation and undertake the task of building sustainable democratic institutions. Ukraine's scores from the Berggruen Governance Index (BGI) between 2000 and 2019 show the ups and downs of state capacity and democratic accountability and illustrate not only how the revolutions remain unfinished but also how the country seems to be unable to consistently advance state formation. Ukraine has yet to find a stable developmental path. Accordingly, BGI scores show that Ukrainian politics and society continue to have difficulty advancing towards a corridor of good governance, where state capacity and accountability reinforce each other and enhance public goods provision. Instead, Ukraine is alternating between authoritarian and democratic development patterns. However, the Russian invasion that began on 24 February 2022 has contributed to uniting and consolidating Ukrainian society and politics and could considerably push the nation‐building process forward.
Abstract by the author: The fight against corruption is presented as a leading principle in policy papers and at donor conferences discussing Ukraine's reconstruction. It therefore mirrors the usual narrative surrounding post‐war reconstruction and democracy promotion attempts. However, reconstruction aid has historically been used for illicit means by elites and ended up strengthening an uneven system rather than building a resilient and successful country, despite the window of opportunity for the latter. Rather than just proposing principles, this paper therefore poses the question of how actors involved in the reconstruction process can be bound to stick to their previously propagated and formally existing principles. The analysis combines academic and policy‐oriented studies and highlights the combined importance of the external and internal dimension for a successful outcome. It proposes a ‘double conditionality’ mechanism, where an independent, technocratic institution holds frozen, Russian assets and partially reimburses Western donors only after successful audits on the reconstruction aid are conducted. This conditionality puts domestic pressure on aid givers to follow through with the anti‐corruption conditions formulated beforehand and to call out any reform bluff on Kyiv's side. Paired with a credible EU accession perspective, this can bring about the much‐needed stimulus for a build back better scenario.
Abstract by the authors: Ukraine has been facing unprecedented challenges since 2014. A Revolution of dignity makes Ukraine turn closer to the EU and NATO, while ongoing and expanded Russian aggression threatens the very existence of Ukrainian statehood. One of the key directions of making Ukraine resilient to threats and challenges is the decentralisation process. It aims at making the government and public administration in Ukraine more democratic, transparent and efficient, open to public concerns and the needs and expectations of local communities. The article proposes analytical approaches towards the decentralisation process taking into account the imperative of democratisation and security challenges that Ukraine has been dealing with. The authors consider both dimensions of the national regional policy and self-government reforms, proposing a balanced vision on their advantages and disadvantages, as well as pointing out key problems that should be attended by the government. The process of decentralisation means a lot for Ukraine to make its statehood stronger and more secure vis-a-vis threats the country is facing now.
Abstract by the author: The article is devoted to the reform of local self-government and territorial organisation of power in Ukraine, which took place in 2014–2020, combining three important tasks: improving the system of public authority, strengthening local self-government, and streamlining the administrative-territorial system in the state. The analysis conducted in the study concerns: the main problems to be addressed by the relevant reform; the chronology of the adoption of key regulations and their role in this process; the results of the amalgamation of territorial communities; and the communities’ ability to ensure the sustainable development of territories. As a result, the article highlights the stages of the implementation of the reform of local self-government and territorial organisation of power in Ukraine, as well as outlines several unresolved issues in this area.
Abstract by the author: Ukraine exhibits two, seemingly contradictory, attitudes towards the International Criminal Court (ICC). On the one hand, it lodged two ad hoc declarations, accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction over certain alleged crimes occurring on its territory since late 2013; on the other hand, the desirability of ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court remains an open question. This problem is exacerbated by the highly contested information environment, as well as by the widespread misunderstanding of the ICC, its functioning, and its likely impact on events in Ukraine. The present article examines the heated debate between national stakeholders from the vantage point of post-truth politics. It also explains how the government can use the status quo to keep prospective international investigations and prosecutions under control.
Abstract by the authors: The article examines areas of combating corruption in Ukraine, as a country with a high level of corruption, and some other countries with successful experience in combating corruption crimes. The article highlights features of state policy and criminal legal means of combating corruption crimes in Ukraine. The shortcoming of the state policy in the field of overcoming corruption were revealed, among which is the fact that Ukraine does not meet the requirements of international instruments for interaction between government and the public. The mechanism of counteraction to corruption in Ukraine is defined and the reasons of high level of corruption in Ukraine are revealed. The international experience in the fight against corruption crimes has been studied in order to identify and borrow effective experience in combating corruption. The experience of countries with a low level of corruption shows that the system of measures to prevent corruption should be based on the principles of legality, publicity, transparency, inevitability of punishment of perpetrators of corruption crimes. Based on foreign experience, recommendations for improving the anticorruption mechanism in Ukraine.
Abstract by the author: A former showman, Volodymyr Zelensky took the theater out of Ukrainian electoral politics by using genuine communication, not pressure, to garner votes. Comedy as a tool of democratic resilience and contestation has remained central to his leadership. In his previous career, Zelensky promoted an expansive vision of Ukrainian political nationhood that elevated local identities. As president, he continued decentralizing reforms. These reforms may hold the key to protecting democracy in postwar Ukraine, where risks may include the reappearance of the partially staged democratic elections that were a key element of politics in independent Ukraine prior to Zelensky.
Abstract by the author: The pro-Russian protests that spread across the east and south of Ukraine in the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution set largely similar regions on starkly different trajectories. While Donbas saw a successful rebellion and later slid into war, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk managed to avoid a separatist scenario. In this article, I examine the critical early stages of the pro-Russian unrest and argue that the initial success of the separatist rebellion in Donbas and its failure in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk can be best explained by the differences in elite strategies and civil society organisation in the respective regions.
Abstract by the author: The annexation of Crimea and the Russia enabled rebellion in Donbas created a need for radical improvements of Ukrainian military capability. This study discusses how different, mostly domestic, reform drivers and reform impeding factors had impact on the pace of Ukrainian top-down defence reform in the period since the confrontation with Russia started in 2014. It concludes that reform has been uneven, and that while vested organizational interests and dominant organizational ideas explain much of the slowness of reform, also corruption played a significant role. Furthermore, the Ukrainian case demonstrates how foreign pressure was important to facilitate reform even in a country that found itself facing the danger of major war. Nevertheless, the study does confirm previous findings that a "threat of defeat in war" in the end overcome domestic restraints to defence reform
Abstract by the author: Blessed by its geology but a prisoner of its geography, the inhabitants of Ukraine have suffered repeated destructive depopulation. The population loss in the Ukraine 1914–21 was over five million. The second modern depopulation culminated in 1932 during Stalin’s manmade famine, with estimated total population losses of 4.6 million people. A third depopulation followed as over 7 million Ukrainians lost their lives in the Second World War. Between the censuses of 1959 and 1970 population of Ukraine recovered briskly. Total fertility remained at about replacement level until the end of the Soviet Union, then declined. A relatively strong recovery of fertility was reversed in 2012, presumably as a consequence of the Russian invasion in Eastern Ukraine, and total fertility dropped to 1.2. The population in early 2022 was around 37 million. The Ukrainian global diaspora is one of the most widely-distributed populations in the world, with 6.1 million Ukrainians living abroad already in 2020. After Russia’s invasion in February 2022 thousands have died and millions have been forced to flee. The article ends by considering how Ukraine’s demographic situation might evolve in the future. This issue of the Yearbook was finalised after Russia attacked Ukraine the 24th of February, 2022. In this invited reflection, professor David Coleman provides an overview of Ukraine’s demographic history and previous challenges.
Abstract by the author: Many words have been used to name and describe the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33, including "famine" and "catastrophe," "the Holodomor," and now "genocide." Was the famine genocide? Was the famine part of a genocide? Is the word genocide an exaggeration? Is naming the famine a genocide part of an attempt to dramatize events for political purposes today? Is the refusal to call the famine a genocide an act of genocide denial? This article argues that, though more than seven decades have passed and the Soviet Union has come and gone, questions about genocide in Ukraine remain intertwined in the discourses and narratives surrounding conflicts over Ukraine's economic, political, social, and cultural position between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Given the implications of this word--"genocide"--within the context of current conflicts over Ukrainian history and identity and even sovereignty, it is important to reflect on how this concept has been used and applied. This paper analyzes conflict in Ukraine in the 1930s using Raphaël Lemkin's definition of genocide, as opposed to the legal definition established by the UN Genocide Convention, and discusses the conceptual strengths of Lemkin's definition of genocide in terms of understanding a wide spectrum of oppressive, repressive, and violent processes of empire-building and colonization that occurred in Ukraine, and which culminated in the Holodomor.
Abstract by the author: Im August begeht die Ukraine den 30. Jahrestag ihrer Unabhängigkeit. Vor dem Hintergrund des Putsches von Teilen der Führung der noch existierenden Sowjetunion gegen die Reformbestrebungen Michail Gorbatschows zur Erneuerung des gemeinsamen Unionsstaates erklärten die Deputierten des Obersten Sowjets der Ukrainischen SSR am 24. August 1991 die Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine.
Abstract by the authors: This paper examines the re-emergence of the memory of the First World War in Russia and Ukraine during the post-Soviet period. It shows what kind of interpretations of the war the governments of these countries have put forward in order to establish new commemorative traditions. It examines the role of non-state actors in the revival of the memory of the war. The article demonstrates that despite sharp differences in attitudes towards the imperial heritage, both countries have structural similarities in their commemoration strategies and they are commensurable to those that developed in Western European countries right after the Great War.
Abstract by the author: This essay critically examines how the militarization of childhood(s) takes place in the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics. The intensification of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine in mid-2014 has had a profound impact on local populations, particularly children. While no systematic recruitment and participation of children in conflict has been reported, childhood has become what Agathangelou and Killian would characterize as a ‘site for displacement and maneuvering for militarization.’ Drawing on feminist methodologies, I examine processes of the militarization of children’s everyday lives. This article investigates a range of ways in which authorities of proto-states in the Donbas region address children as participants and potential collaborators in the processes of militarization. In my analysis, I examine how war and preparation for it are simultaneously co-constituted by the geopolitical—legitimation of new proto-states—and everyday practices, such as engaging with school curricula, visiting museums, and (re)inventing historical narratives. Understanding of mechanisms that militarize childhood and how children become subjects and objects of militarization allows for a critical analysis that reveals spaces of everyday violence. This article, therefore, enhances our understanding about the intersections of childhood, militarism, and security.
Abstract by the author: Contrary to Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical arguments, there was little chance that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine would benefit Russia’s position in the European balance of power and enhance its overall security. Instead, I argue that Putin’s decision was based on domestic interests, mainly the regime’s legitimation, a major pillar of authoritarian stability. Using a multi-method research design, I demonstrate that the war has significant potential to boost Putin’s popularity, nationalism and authoritarian preferences in society, as well as to strengthen his image as the country’s heroic protector. As in several autocracies, the instrumentalization of security concerns and existential threats are a powerful source of regime cohesion. These arguments are corroborated by data from Russia’s current and previous conflicts, such as elites’ discourse, analysis of repressive policies, and public opinion polls on Putin’s rule and authoritarian preferences. The regime needs a hostile ‘West’ and a threatening Ukraine for self-legitimation.
Abstract by the author: This article belongs to the special cluster “Here to Stay: The Politics of History in Eastern Europe”, guest-edited by Félix Krawatzek & George Soroka. The rise of historical memory, which began in the 1970s and 1980s, has made the past an increasingly important soft-power resource. At its initial stage, the rise of memory contributed to the decay of self-congratulatory national narratives and to the formation of a “cosmopolitan” memory centered on the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity and informed by the notion of state repentance for the wrongdoings of the past. Laws criminalizing the denial of these crimes, which were adopted in “old” continental democracies in the 1980s and 1990s, were a characteristic expression of this democratic culture of memory. However, with the rise of national populism and the formation of the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland in the 2000s and 2010s, the politics of memory has taken a significantly different turn. National populists are remarkably persistent in whitewashing their countries’ history and using it to promote nationalist mobilization. This process has manifested itself in the formation of new types of memory laws, which shift the blame for historical injustices to other countries (the 1998 Polish, the 2000 Czech, the 2010 Lithuanian, the June 2010 Hungarian, and the 2014 Latvian statutes) and, in some cases, openly protect the memory of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity (the 2005 Turkish, the 2014 Russian, the 2015 Ukrainian, the 2006 and the 2018 Polish enactments). The article examines Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian legislation regarding the past that demonstrates the current linkage between populism and memory.
Abstract by the author: Are the human, social, political, and economic sciences useful for making predictions? They failed to foresee the major subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, while more recently, in February 2022, a number of experts embarrassed themselves by explaining, on the eve of the war in Ukraine, that the invasion would not happen. Making short-term predictions is a very risky exercise.
Abstract by the author: Do the elections and opinion polling help to assess the level of popular support for the policies of Russian president Vladimir Putin, such as the invasion of Ukraine? This essay argues that Russia under Putin represents an instance of plebiscitary democracy, a regime with a strong leader relying on popular legitimacy derived from the passive and disenchanted masses. In such a regime, both elections and polling function according to the principle of acclamation, validating the ready-made decisions rather than revealing the public choice. Historically, plebiscitary democracies tend to engage in unprovoked wars that precipitate their demise. However, the temptations of plebiscitary design for contemporary liberal democracies should not be underestimated.
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