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Selected Online Reading on Sakharov Prize Laureates: and their Causes (2016-2020)

This special series briefly presents Sakharov Prize laureates and provides readings giving an insight into a current state of play of the causes they were standing up for.

2020: Democratic opposition in Belarus

Abstract by the author: Following Belarus’s fraudulent presidential election on August 9, hundreds of thousands took to the streets, creating an unprecedented threat to the rule of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Protest leaders have explicitly distinguished their new movement from the “color revolutions” that have taken place in other postcommunist countries. Rather than calling for major changes in geopolitical orientation, they have focused their demands on free and democratic elections together with a return to the constitutional status quo that existed before Lukashenka. The dictator himself has miscalculated by underestimating opposition-unifier Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Even if Belarus’s antirevolutionary uprising fails to oust Lukashenka, it has destroyed the perception that he is invulnerable to opposition challenge. Belarusian democracy may well be on the horizon.

Abstract by the author: This paper analyses the effects on Belarus of European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia, on the one hand, and Russian sanctions on Ukrainian and EU goods, on the other. International sanctions opened up new political and economic opportunities that the Belarusian authorities sought to capitalise on. But Minsk's attempts to swim between two waters (retaining the benefits Moscow offered while improving relations with the EU) have backfired and distrust towards Minsk has grown in Moscow, Brussels and Kiev. A theoretical approach is made to the foreign policy of small states, before this paper shows how Belarus has been harmed by its attempts to take advantage of EU and Russian sanctions regimes.

Abstract by the author: Following Belarus’s fraudulent presidential election on August 9, hundreds of thousands took to the streets, creating an unprecedented threat to the rule of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Protest leaders have explicitly distinguished their new movement from the “color revolutions” that have taken place in other postcommunist countries. Rather than calling for major changes in geopolitical orientation, they have focused their demands on free and democratic elections together with a return to the constitutional status quo that existed before Lukashenka. The dictator himself has miscalculated by underestimating opposition-unifier Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Even if Belarus’s antirevolutionary uprising fails to oust Lukashenka, it has destroyed the perception that he is invulnerable to opposition challenge. Belarusian democracy may well be on the horizon.

Abstract by the authors: In recent literature on post-Soviet electoral revolutions in places where attempts at regime change through popular protest did not succeed, opposition groups are often simply regarded as ‘failed’. And yet, opposition actors exist and participate in the political life of their country. Building on the Belarusian and Azerbaijani cases, we argue that opposition actors are maintained in a ‘ghetto’, often virtual, tightly managed by the ruling authorities who exert monopolistic control over civic activities. Opposition actors adapt to the restricted conditions – accepting a certain level of dependency. They thus develop various tactics to engage with the outside, striving to reduce the ghetto walls. To this end this article proposes a typology of what we call oppositional ‘resistance models’: electoral, in the media, lobbying and through education. The models highlight what makes ‘opposition’ in authoritarian states and are a step towards a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon in this context.

2019: Ilham Tohti, human rights of China's Uyghur minority

Abstract by the author: This article provides an overview of People’s Republic of China (PRC) counter-terrorism policies targeting Uyghurs since 2001 when the state first asserted that it faced a terrorist threat from this population. In reviewing these policies and their impact, it suggests that the state has gradually isolated and excluded Uyghurs from PRC society. Drawing on the writings of Michael Foucault, it articulates this gradual exclusion of Uyghurs as an expression of biopolitics where the Uyghur people as a whole have come to symbolize an almost biological threat to society that must be quarantined through surveillance, punishment, and detention. Rather than suggesting that these impacts of China’s “war on terror” coincide with the intent of state policy, the article argues that they are inevitable outcomes of labeling a given ethnic population as a terrorist threat in the age of the Global War on Terror.

Abstract by the authors: In 2017–18, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed its domestic security strategy in Xinjiang, escalating the use of mass detention, ideological re-education, and pressure on Uyghur diaspora networks. Commonly proposed explanations for this shift focus on domestic factors: ethnic unrest, minority policy, and regional leadership. The CCP's strategy changes in Xinjiang, however, were also likely catalyzed by changing perceptions of the threat posed by Uyghur contact with transnational Islamic militant groups in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and a corresponding increase in perceived domestic vulnerability. This threat shifted from theoretical risk to operational reality in 2014–16, and occurred alongside a revised assessment that China's Muslim population was more vulnerable to infiltration by jihadist networks than previously believed. Belief in the need to preventively inoculate an entire population from “infection” by these networks explains the timing of the change in repressive strategy, shift toward collective detention, heavy use of re-education, and attention paid to the Uyghur diaspora. It therefore helps explain specific aspects of the timing and nature of the CCP's strategy changes in Xinjiang. These findings have implications for the study of the connections between counterterrorism and domestic repression, as well as for authoritarian preventive repression and Chinese security policy at home and abroad.

Abstract by the author: Previous scholarship has identified an emerging consensus for ethnic-policy reform in China, in the direction of strengthening national integration and a ‘melting pot.’ This article identifies three major contending schools in Chinese debates about the country’s ethnic governance: liberal autonomists, integrationists and socialist autonomists. It argues that the socialist autonomists, who oppose the ‘melting pot,’ have prevailed politically. Contention among the three schools, specifically, revolves around tradeoffs between autonomy and ethnic particularism. That is, compromised autonomy but preferential policies. The liberal autonomists reject the tradeoffs because of the cost to autonomy. The integrationists reject the tradeoffs because of the divisive role of ethnic particularism. The socialist autonomists, however, embrace the tradeoffs because of the developmental and distributional benefits. With the leftward turn of the Xi Jinping regime, they have prevailed ideologically and politically to safeguard the current system from any fundamental change.

Abstract by the author: The importance of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to China, economically, politically, and strategically, cannot be overstated. Covering 640,000 square miles, Uyghuristan is approximately the size of Iran. Located in the far west, it is Beijing's largest administrative unit encompassing one-sixth of China's territory. Due to an abundance of coal, natural gas, and oil, accounting for roughly a quarter of China's total reserves, Uyghuristan has been described as the country's "national energy strategy base." These energy resources have been indispensable to "growing" the Chinese economy and maintaining the Chinese Communist Party in power. Strategically, Uyghuristan is the vital link for the Chinese economy's increasing need for imported oil from Central Asia and, through the Pakistan pipeline corridor, the Persian Gulf. It is the key to the success of Beijing's ambitious "One Road, One Belt Initiative" to link the economies of Eurasia to China through infrastructure development. The most important strategic value of Uyghuristan, however, resides in its geography. Consisting mostly of mountains and deserts, the sheer vastness of this inhospitable land provides a natural barrier protecting "China Proper", the heavily populated lands in the east of the country lying between the Yellow River in the north and the Xi River in the south, from land invasions. For these reasons, China will not relinquish control over Uyghuristan, its resources or its people. The people are Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim nation, who have been seeking their political independence for most of the Twentieth Century. The fall of the last imperial dynasty of China, the Qing, in 1911, was followed by the collapse of the Chinese state. In the ensuing political instability, the Uyghurs declared their independence as the East Turkestan Republic - twice. The first time was in 1933 and endured until suppressed by Nationalist Chinese forces under Chiang Kai-shek in 1934. A second East Turkestan Republic was established in 1944 and lasted until it was overthrown by Communist Chinese forces under Mao Zedong in 1949. Since the 1990s, Beijing has initiated measures to permanently secure Uyghuristan to China by colonizing the land with Chinese settlers. These policies have succeeded in reducing Uyghurs from a majority to a plurality. The objective appears to be to make Uyghurs a demographic minority in their own homeland. Chinese colonization has provoked riots by Uyghurs, ethnic clashes between Uyghurs and Chinese migrants, and repeated calls by Uyghurs for their right to self-determination. Beijing's response as reflected in its 2014 "strike hard campaign against terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism" has, itself, been extreme. In the words of a UN human rights panel, Uyghuristan now resembles a "massive internment camp that is shrouded in secrecy, a sort of 'no rights zone'...members of the Uyghur community and other Muslims were being treated as 'enemies of the state' solely on the basis of their ethno-religious identity." This article will examine these issues and the fundamental question they raise -- are Uyghurs victims of genocide as legally defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide?

Abstract by the author: This paper is structured as follows. Section two contains an overview of China’s constitutional protection of religious freedoms and its inherent limitations. Section three outlines the administrative structure that oversees the regulation of religious affairs at the national level. Section four provides an analysis of relevant religious policy and regulations within Xinjiang specifically. Section five examines how the United Nations (UN) has sought to develop a working definition of the term ‘culture’ which ultimately led to its use by the CESCR. Section six then uses this definition as an analytical lens to consider the applicability of the protections within Article 15 with respect to the religious identity of the Uyghur Muslim minority. Finally, section seven contains concluding remarks on the paper's findings.

Abstract by the author: Governments with strict control over the information that their citizens hear from foreign sources are regular targets of human rights pressure, but we know little about how this information matters in the domestic realm. I argue that authoritarian regimes strategically pass on certain types of external pressure to their public to “internationalize” human rights violations, making citizens view human rights in terms of defending their nation internationally rather than in terms of individual violations, and making them more likely to be satisfied with their government’s behavior. I find strong support for this model through statistical analysis of Chinese state media reports of external human rights pressure and a survey experiment on Chinese citizens’ responses to pressure on women’s rights. This analysis demonstrates that authoritarian regimes may be able to manipulate international human rights diplomacy to help them retain the support of their population while suppressing their human rights.

2018: Oleg Sentsov Ukraine-Russia Crimea crisis

Abstract by the author: In the aftermath of the EU’s diplomatic mission to resolve the Orange Revolution in 2004, several Russian policy makers perceived the EU as an aggressive actor which sought to undermine Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. About a decade later, Russian policy makers are mocking the EU’s limited abilities in the ongoing Ukraine crisis. The purpose of this article is to explain the reasons for this change of the EU’s abilities by focusing on its state-building in Ukraine. The article examines the EU’s state-building initiatives in Ukraine between November 2013 and July 2015. The article assesses the factors which shape the EU’s state-building in Ukraine. It argues that the EU’s state-building was hampered by two interrelated factors. First, the EU did not possess the policy tools to counter-balance Russia’s affirmative foreign policy towards Ukraine which was reflected in Crimea’s annexation to Russia. Second, as a consequence, this annexation turned Ukraine into a case of contested statehood.

Abstract by the authors: Do international economic sanctions backfire politically, resulting in increased rather than decreased domestic support for targeted state leaders? Backfire arguments are common, but researchers have only recently begun systematically studying sanctions’ impact on target-state public opinion, not yet fully unpacking different possible backfire mechanisms. We formulate backfire logic explicitly, distinguishing between ‘scapegoating’ and ‘rallying’ mechanisms and considering the special case of ‘smart sanctions’ aimed at crony elites rather than the masses. We test five resulting hypotheses using an experimental design and pooled survey data spanning the imposition of sanctions in one of the most substantively important cases where the backfire argument has been prominent: Western sanctions on Russia in 2014. We find no evidence of broad sanctions backfire. Instead, sanctions have forced Russia’s president to pay a political price. But this price has been low compared to the massive political benefits we document arising from the sanctions-triggering event, the Crimea annexation. Moreover, hidden by aggregate figures are signs of a ‘backlash of the better-off’ by which ‘smart’ sanctions turn economic well-being from a predictor of opposition into a predictor of regime support.

Abstract by the author: Overshadowed by their far more numerous counterparts from Donbas, Crimean IDPs have been underexamined and misunderstood. Relying on interviews and focus groups conducted amongst Crimean IDPs, the essay traces the experiences and conditions of Russian occupation that have triggered the migration of Crimeans to mainland Ukraine since 2014. Pointing to how both structural forces and human agency are at play in the political, socio-economic and emotional factors driving their displacement, this essay argues that migration from occupied Crimea to mainland Ukraine—like all migrant flows—is neither exclusively forced nor entirely voluntary

Abstract by the authors: The current research seeks to develop an analysis of Ukraine's Euromaidan social movement in psychological terms. Building on the classic understanding of social competition strategies, we argue that Euromaidan protests can be conceived as an attempt of pro‐European Union (EU) Ukrainians to realign the boundaries of the Ukrainian national identity by defeating the alternative pro‐Russia integration project championed by the government. In particular, building on the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action, we suggest that Euromaidan is an emergent opinion‐based group identity, formed in response to injustice through two self‐categorical processes – group‐level self‐investment into the shared entity (i.e., Ukrainian national category) and disidentification from the alternative Russia‐led Customs Union. Using a sample of 3,096 participants surveyed during the protests, we tested our hypotheses with structural equation modelling, where the model accounting for the direct and indirect paths of the self‐categorical processes was expected to explain collective action intentions to a great extent than models applying the social identity and encapsulation models of collective action. We found evidence consistent with the proposal that Euromaidan was a pro‐EU opinion‐based group, formed in response to the government's decision to suspend the EU–Ukraine agreement and around individuals' general perception of unfair government authorities

Abstract by the author: Este artículo analiza las sanciones internacionales impuestas a Rusia por parte de la UE como consecuencia de la anexión de Crimea y el conflicto en el Donbás, así como su impacto en términos políticos y económicos en los estados miembros, en determinados sectores económicos y sobre Rusia. Asimismo, aborda cómo la diversidad de posiciones en el seno del Consejo Europeo afecta al proceso de toma de decisiones en esta materia, donde cada vez más se hacen oír voces críticas contra estas medidas. El estudio se desarrolla sobre postulados normativos que se trasladarán al caso específico para observar el comportamiento de los actores involucrados y las distintas reacciones que se van dando a lo largo del tiempo, entre ellas la de España. Así, quiere ser una contribución a la literatura académica en materia de sanciones internacionales aplicando a este caso de estudio específico las tipologías de sanciones existentes.  

2017: Democratic Opposition in Venezuela

Abstract by the author: The article discusses a popular opposition politician, Henrique Capriles in Venezuela broke with US-backed leader Juan Guaidó, whose coalition has vowed to boycott the crisis-torn nation''s upcoming congressional elections claiming they're rigged. It mentions Capriles said that he was looking for a political event that mobilizes" the country; and Capriles has expressed frustration at Guaido's efforts to maintain a parallel, virtual presidency that lacks any real power.

Abstract by the author: After opposition leader Juan Guaidó challenged Nicolás Maduro's leadership in January 2019, what has happened in Venezuela at the political, economic, and social levels? What has been the international response to the Venezuelan crisis? This paper aims to provide an overview of domestic processes that took place in Venezuela in 2019. It begins by highlighting the political challenge to the autocratic regime of Nicolás Maduro when the president of the National Assembly assumed the role of interim president of Venezuela. Then, it examines the main socioeconomic problems in Venezuela, and how the international community reacted to these challenges. The final section discusses the current situation of the regime and the opposition after a year of attempts at dialogue and negotiation.

Abstract by the author: In recent years, two main political poles have consolidated in Venezuela, those in favor of the late President Hugo Chávez or Chavistas and those in opposition. Despite their divergent propositions and deep social polarization, the two camps share similarities, and in a way each camp has reinforced the existence of the other through its discursive practices. This paper investigates the role of the opposition in consolidating a populist discourse in Venezuela. Through a qualitative content analysis of online news articles, the paper shows that the ideas and discourse of the anti-Chávez movement between 2000 and 2012 consolidated the populist discourse of the Chavista government.

Abstract by the author: This article discusses how electoral irregularities contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela under rule (1999-2019). It draws from an original database of electoral irregularities created from primary and secondary sources covering a total of 24 electoral contests. I find that Venezuela experienced 117 electoral irregularities during this twenty-year period. Almost every electoral contest exhibited one irregularity, if not more. Electoral irregularities served two goals: to provide double insurance for the ruling party, and to encourage abstentionism (and divisions) across the opposition. They also increased every time the ruling party felt more electorally threatened. The article proposes a typology of irregularities applicable to other cases. It also evaluates how the opposition responded to the rise of irregularities, pointing out strategies that failed and those that worked.

Abstract by the author: This article uses the political science literature on transitions to democracy to discuss the domestic challenges to a negotiated transition in Venezuela. Whereas a transition to democracy may occur through many different pathways and processes, the negotiated path has often been hailed as the most conducive to democracy consolidation. This article discusses three key challenges to a negotiated outcome in Venezuela. The first is the current political-economic context marked by de-liberalisation and rapidly increasing inequality between the "ins" and "outs"; the second refers to the content of a potential pact in a situation where the Venezuelan state is retrenching territorially and from key state functions; and the third refers to the challenges of guaranteeing a pact for the future in a context of a majoritarian constitution and weak electoral prospects for the regime. The article shows how the structural conditions in Venezuela reduces the incentives for both parties to enter a democratising pact and add insights to the transitology literature on how de-liberalisation and stateness problems negatively affect actors' incentives to negotiate a pact.

2016: Nadia Murad and Lamiya Aji Bashar, Islamic state survivors

Abstract by the author: Although as of early 2019 ISIS has lost all of the territories it occupied, scholarly and media attention has continued to focus on its barbarity and brutal treatment of the women living in its former territories. The extremist group has committed a long list of severe human rights violations since it seized territories in Iraq and Syria. In this article, I aim to illustrate the reporting of this violence against the Yazidi women from 2014 to 2019 by the UK’s national newspapers because the media’s portrayal of these women shapes public opinion and policy towards this group in relation to the violence they have endured. The results indicate that while UK national newspapers give preferential treatment in their coverage of Yazidi women’s experiences of violence, abuse, and torture, they often ignore these women’s agency and activism in terms of the extent to which these women resisted and coped with the atrocities they endured.

Abstract by the author:  Research into the psychological consequences of rape on women in war and warlike situations is limited. The aims of this study were (a) to describe the prevalence and the nature of PTSD symptoms among Yazidi women reporting rape during IS captivity, (b) to describe comorbidity of other psychological disorders, and (c) to examine the risk factors associated with posttraumatic stress disorder.The study included 296 Yazidi women survivors of rape and has been conducted in Germany since January 2016 as part of a special-quota project in the German region of Baden-Wuerttemberg, designed to support the women and children who have escaped after being held hostage by IS.The survivors were recruited into a retrospective, cross-sectional study. Interviews in Germany were done through trained personnel to evaluate the mental health status of raped women. All the investigated women had been raped many times during IS captivity. About 82% of the women were also physically tortured. Of the sample, 67% suffered from somatoform disorder, 53% suffered from depression, 39% from anxiety, and 28% from dissociation. The prevalence of PTSD in those with rape events of more than 20 times was 57% (95% CI = 35.1–65.9%), less than 20 times was 41% (95%, CI = 28.7–4.8% and less than 10 times 39% [95% CI = 28.2–41.8%], respectively. The IS captivity and wartime rapes had deep immediate and long-term consequences on the mental health of women survivors. The high prevalence of PTSD emphasizes the need for culturally sensitive diagnostic and therapeutic services to address the intermediate and long-term consequences of wartime rape.

Abstract by the authors: 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) undertook a systematic and deliberate campaign against minority groups and non-Sunni Muslim communities. Amongst some of the greatest atrocities were those targeted towards Yazidi communities and in particular their women. The mental health outcomes of those women held in captivity requires investigation. This study sought to examine and compare levels of general psychological distress, depression, generalized anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and self-reported suicidal thoughts and behaviors amongst Yazidi women held in captivity compared with those without such experiences. Between January to May 2019, a total 348 Yazidi women located in internal displaced person (IDP) camps were interviewed. Of these 348, 139 females were survivors of ISIS captivity. Measures used included Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10), Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7), and Harvard Trauma Questionnaire part IV (HTQ part IV). Formerly enslaved Yazidi females showed a significantly higher prevalence of severe mental distress (97.1%; P 0.001), more severe levels of depression (36.7%; P 0.001) and general anxiety symptoms (37.4%; P 0.001), greater rates of PTSD (90.6%; P 0.001) and higher reported rates of suicidal ideation (38.1%; P 0.001). Logistic regression analysis undertaken to examine the role of sociodemographic factors as predictors of the assessed mental health conditions. Amongst the formerly enslaved group, no such significance was found, however amongst the non-enslaved group, unemployment was found to statistically determine depression, generalized anxiety and PTSD. Specifically, women from the non-enslaved group who were unemployed were 2.5 times more likely to have depression, 3 times more likely to have generalized anxiety and 3.3 times more likely to have PTSD. Finally, amongst the non-enslaved group, those women with between 5 to 8 siblings were significantly less likely to have depression than those with fewer siblings. Rates of distress and trauma related symptomology were significantly higher amongst those with history of enslavement. Sociodemographic factors and duration of enslavement do not seem to predict mental disorders among enslaved females.

Abstract by the authors: Even though almost three years have passed since the black banners of the terror organisation, calling themselves the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) were first hoisted throughout the Yezidi heartland of Sinjar, the Yezidi community continues to be targeted by ISIS, militias. 300,000 vegetate in camps as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Iraqi Kurdistan; thousands of others have been killed, are missing, or remain in captivity where they are subjected to unspeakable sexual and physical abuse. With deference for these victims of violence, and without detracting from the collective suffering and trauma of the entire Yezidi community of Sinjar (families, women, men, and children alike), the authors have chosen to focus the present article on the plight and misery of the females; who were, and still are, facing despicable sexual abuses, unfathomable atrocities, and unfettered human rights violations. In doing so, they highlight the views of the fundamentalist Islam practiced by ISIS that encourages sex-slavery, while elaborating on the complacent acceptance of ISIS terror tactics by the local Sunni population of the territories they control. The work goes on to describe how survivors escaped, as well as how they are received and treated by the Yezidi community and state authorities. This discussion includes an overview of the national and international mechanisms available for prosecuting ISIS members for their crimes of genocide against the Yezidi people. The authors further stress that the genocide has contributed to, and even accelerated the process of the Yezidi selfidentification as a unique ethno-religious entity; which, in turn, has produced changes to their religious traditions. These changes will be briefly covered by examining a new approach to the institution of the Kerāfat.

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