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Abstract: With the rise of non-executive forms of diplomacy, political scientists have increasingly focused on the role of parliaments as diplomatic actors. This article aims to deepen the study of European parliamentary diplomacy through an extensive case study of transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy (TPD) between the European Parliament and the US Congress during the Obama and Trump administrations (2009–21). It is hypothesised that the decrease in EU–US political alignment under the Trump administration resulted in a corresponding decrease in both the salience and positivity of TPD. Counter-intuitively, the data shows that the decrease in political alignment correlated with a higher quantity of TPD. However, a content analysis of the joint reports of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue indicates that the attitude of this TPD is found to have become increasingly negative.
Abstract: European states currently lack a clear joint strategy on China and a coordinated approach to US–China competition. This article offers a novel perspective on the challenges for European approaches to this issue due to an omnipresent transatlantic component and the risk of an alliance dilemma. Illustratively focusing on France, Germany and the UK, it demonstrates that Europeans are facing a transatlantic alliance dilemma with the risks of abandonment and entrapment. It argues that Europe needs to strike a balance between its dependence on Washington, especially with regard to European security, while fearing entrapment by the US approach towards Beijing as it aims to maintain economic ties with China. The article concludes that the ramifications of this dilemma can be mitigated through a distinctly European approach to China, strengthening European coordination on China and bolstering European strategic autonomy. As a conceptual piece rather than a full empirical analysis, this article therefore unpacks the strategic challenge and lays the groundwork for further empirical works on the topic.
Abstract: Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is not an accident but an inevitable consequence of how the West, especially the US, has utilised NATO in the post-Cold War period. This encompasses the activities which the US has supported NATO to pursue in the last 30 years: transformation, expansion, and participation in "out of area" actions. However, the US has never found it easy to help NATO remain the leading security organisation in Europe, not only because of threats posed by outside actors like Russia but also the mounting internal challenges, especially the long-standing issue of a "two-tiered" alliance. Washington has already shown reluctance to utilise NATO in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and now Ukraine to varying degrees. This paper seeks to understand why the US has remained committed to NATO and how the future US-NATO relationship will likely fare, including whether the Ukraine crisis can inject new life into the Alliance. It is believed that in the current context of uncertainty posed by NATO's "Smart Defence" and the US "Pivot to Asia", it seems highly likely that unless something changes, NATO will end up just doing less with less.
Abstract: This article clarifies the role of trust in alliances with a focus on NATO. We bridge IR scholarship on trust and alliance theory by dealing with trust as a central factor in maintaining alliance cohesion and longevity. NATO has, throughout its history, been characterised by an asymmetric trusting relationship, with Europe being more vulnerable to defection than its American counterpart. This means that a fear of abandonment, intrinsic to the structure of reciprocal commitment in all alliances, has been felt differently on the opposite sides of the Atlantic, with implications for how specific crises have led to a fluctuation in (mis)trust. Whereas the Europeans have harboured mistrust regarding the longevity of the US commitment and extended deterrence, the Americans have doubted the Europeans' faithfulness to US leadership and willingness to share the alliance's burdens. Simultaneously, general trust - cultivated by shared interests, institutions, interdependence and converging identities - has bound the allies together. The article then uses these insights to analyse the Trump presidency, which marked an historic spike in mistrust between the US and the Europeans. Despite the unforeseen tumult, the presidency did not result in the definitive collapse of trust in the trans-Atlantic relationship, let alone NATO.
Abstract: Does “shaming” work in NATO? More precisely, does publicly using negative language criticizing allies’ defense spending improve burden-sharing, or is it counterproductive, leading to lower spending? We evaluate the effectiveness of public shaming language; specifically, whether it increases allies’ defense spending or whether other considerations like external threat, domestic budgets, economic growth, or unemployment rates are better predictors of contributions. Using an original dataset of presidential statements and NATO defense spending data disaggregated across the four categories tracked by the alliance, we conclude that negative language toward allies’ spending is at best ineffective and may even adversely affect burden-sharing in the long run. These findings have important implications for the political economy of alliances and both theories and policies on the use of rhetorical pressure to elicit compliance in asymmetric power relationships.
Abstract: European governments are following the course of the 2024 US presidential race more closely than any election in recent times. Although the outcome is hard to predict, many are particularly nervous about a second Trump administration, with good reason. European governments need to plan how to react to this prospect. The future of the Transatlantic Relationship could be at stake and Europe must try to get through a potentially very difficult period ahead.
Abstract: Though it is a core function of a sovereign state, governments do not navigate defense policy free from outside influences and constraints. The provision of external security requires armed forces to be adequately equipped but the distribution of material resources - defense-industrial capacity - for such equipment is not even but rather concentrated in the international system. How do alliance politics and defense-industrial policy connect? Our contribution highlights the material resources for military alliance effectiveness and emphasizes a strategic view of the relationship between these material factors and alliance burden-sharing. The sudden surge in demand for materiel resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine revealed the defense-industrial fault lines within the transatlantic alliance. We outline existing dependencies and interdependencies, identify trade-offs and connections between industrial policy and defense spending, and formulate policy recommendations based on our findings. Taking a political economy of security perspective, these recommendations are aimed at a better understanding of how industrial politics and alliance stability are intertwined. They suggest pathways to a new and more stable transatlantic defense-industrial bargain in an era of increased great power conflict.
Abstract: In March 2018, U.S. President Trump announced that the U.S. would start imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from most exporting countries around the world. This study explores the impact of introducing these tariffs on the equity return of U.S. defense companies. As the defense industry stands among the largest metal consumers in the U.S., it is expected that these import restrictions have deteriorated the business performance of the U.S. defense industry. For this study, a novel trade uncertainty indicator has been constructed that is based on the key events related to the invocation of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. This section empowers the President to impose trade restrictions when the quantity of imports threatens to impair national security. My empirical analysis reveals that investors perceived the introduction of the steel and aluminum tariffs as detrimental to U.S. defense companies. The negative abnormal stock returns in the days around several key tariff-related events evidence this. Already in the period before the Department of Commerce released the findings of its investigation, investors were speculating on the possible introduction of trade barriers. However, the height of the imposed tariff exceeded their expectations since the negative sentiment was further reinforced after the official announcement of the tariff by President Trump.
Abstract: In 2021, the USA and the European Union (EU) expressed an interest in deepening their cooperation with each other and other international actors on export controls to address evolving security risks, including the misuse of dual-use technologies to violate human rights. This interest presents an opportunity to probe the potential for US–EU leadership, as a stated intention of these actors, in developing standards that incorporate human rights considerations into export control policy. To undertake this analysis, this article assesses the legal and political context in which the USA and the EU regulate exports and how this context affects potential opportunities for leadership. The article contends that the USA and EU may struggle to exercise joint leadership due to their divergent systems but may be capable of doing so if they invest in creative diplomatic efforts. In particular, the USA possesses greater legal flexibility than the EU to propose new standards and to engage in diplomatic efforts to multilateralize them. In short, the EU’s structural limitations create a dynamic in which the EU will rely heavily on US diplomacy, as well as that of its Member States, to achieve its objective of creating US–EU leadership in this area.
Abstract: US President Joe Biden has worked to repair the damage done to the transatlantic relationship by his predecessor, quickly realigning the United States with Europe on issues of energy and climate change. However, the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 introduced a raft of protectionist subsidies for US clean-energy industries and reignited tensions between the US and the European Union. The EU has warned that the IRA could damage the bloc's industry and American critics suggest the act may trigger a new US-EU trade war. The Biden administration's geopolitical internationalism is at odds with its geo-economic nationalism. The fact remains, however, that Europe is unlikely to be severely affected by the IRA. Moreover, European political leaders have threatened more aggressive responses to the IRA than they can deliver. A trade war is unlikely. It is more likely that booming green industries in the EU and US will open new avenues to cooperation between them.
Abstract: In spite of being criticised as ‘talking shops’ and easily replaced by technological innovations, dialogues – defined as face-to-face interactions in an institutionalised framework – remain a staple of international politics. While prevailing accounts have shown that dialogues help states advance their quest for security and profit, the key role dialogues play in the quest for recognition has been overlooked and remains undertheorised. Emphasising the socio-psychological need for ontological security, this article argues that institutions relentlessly engage in dialogues because it allows them to seek, gain and anchor the recognition of their identity. The significance for international relations is illustrated through the emblematic case of the European Union–US dialogues, specifically the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue. The multi-method qualitative analysis based on original interviews, participant observations, visuals and official documents demonstrates how the European Union exploits these dialogues with its ‘Significant Other’ to seek, gain and anchor the recognition of its complex institutional identity.
Abstract: An EU–US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has been a key element of transatlantic cooperation in trade and technology in global challenges against a backdrop of decades of complex disputes, regulatory cooperation failures and minimalistic combined multilateralism. It was by intent seeking to move beyond regulatory cooperation and instead was to focus upon policy and shared global challenges. The TTC has evolved during a US administration prioritizing soft law in international economic law, arguably increasingly influencing the EU. The TTC has a complex and bifurcated approach to law that is explored here, arguably evident of its post-Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) identity in an era of a shift away from trade agreements. This paper argues that its soft law structures, executive to executive set-up and wide-ranging emphasis on international law-making goals contrasts considerably with certain developments in EU–US data and digital trade governance, involving hard law solutions. The TTC aligns well with broader trends in international economic law preferring soft law solutions. The TTC raises questions as to the place of global law-making goals in the complex transatlantic relationship. It examines its overtly legalistic framing yet heavily delegalized outcomes using soft law, grounded in international law references.
Abstract : Proposals for the establishment of plurilateral climate clubs have gained momentum, and both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) will play a pivotal role in forthcoming negotiations. This article closely examines EU and US proposals to uncover distinctive features in their regulatory approaches and to critically assess different potential models for sectoral climate club arrangements. The article argues that a middle ground could be reached by combining the US policy‐neutral approach with the EU distinctive product‐based focus. A bottom‐up model involving average sectoral carbon intensity reduction targets, product standards and bans could provide an effective and practicable way forward. Recent declarations confirm that the negotiations of the Global Steel and Aluminium Arrangement are focusing on product standards. Nonetheless, several challenges lie ahead. These include the difficult coordination between plurilateral arrangements and the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the US focus on non‐market economies and excess capacity.
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