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Abstract by the author: This article analyses how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the relationship between Europe and the US, and provides suggestions on how transatlantic cooperation should be taken forward. The pandemic has increased public distrust of the US in Europe due to the way the former has chosen to respond to COVID-19. However, this article argues that the pandemic has mainly accelerated existing transatlantic differences rather than creating new ones. To restore the transatlantic relationship, Europe and the US should strengthen their cooperation on common challenges such as climate change, health security, China, terrorism and migration. COVID-19 has highlighted the limitations of nationalist and unilateral policies in confronting global challenges. It may, in the end, provide the impetus for a rejuvenated transatlantic partnership and build a renewed sense of transatlantic solidarity.
Abstract by the authors: This article introduces the research problem and questions guiding the special issue, situating them in the relevant academic context with references to the literature on soft power and its historical and contemporary relevance for the transatlantic relationship. Based on a reconceptualization of the notion of soft power in the context of 'Transatlantica', defined as the political and geographical space inhabited by the EU and the US, it provides an overview of the key insights of the research articles and synthesizes the findings emerging from the different policy domains studied in the special issue. It concludes by deriving the broader conceptual insights - in particular an expanded conception of soft power - as well as the normative, policy-relevant implications from these findings.
Abstract by the author: The ideal of freedom has historically instituted the Transatlantic Community of Values spanning the USA and Europe. Given the framework of liberal crises that currently dominates Western mental maps, it is crucial to contemplate what has happened to this legacy of freedom and, consequently, to the very foundations of this value community. To achieve this, we draw on the theoretical debates on freedom to construct a novel conceptual framework of the potential uses of the notion in political discourses. This scaffold is then utilised as a tool to analyse, and ultimately compare, the employment of freedom in a selection of documents produced by the leaderships of the EU and the USA since the turn of the millennium.
Abstract by the author: Europe remains as important as ever for US security but several factors contribute to a degree of unsteadiness in the 2020 European security environment. The outcome of conflict between forces of stasis and change over the next two to four years will be determined by several dynamics including Europe’s response to the COVID-19 economic crisis, Russia’s desire to shatter transatlantic relations, the American approach to NATO, the impact of Brexit, whether German leaders will lead, and French efforts to address long-term economic malaise.
Abstract by the authors: President Donald Trump has adopted a critical position on NATO, raising concerns of an American abandonment of its obligations to Europe’s defence. The severity of Trump’s position is unusual, but some of his concerns are of long-standing and likely to be voiced in some form by his successor in the White House. American criticism and equivocation has led the European allies to engage in various forms of hedging. Some of these strategies are designed to keep the US attached to NATO; others bypass the alliance – cultivating either bilateral links to the US or a strengthening of EU defence cooperation. Hedging, whatever its form, is potentially damaging to alliance effectiveness and cohesion. In that light, NATO’s interests are better served by a strategy which builds upon the NATO-EU relationship and which advertises the benefits of European effort within NATO itself. To that end, we argue in favour of a reformulation of an old but much misunderstood idea – that of NATO’s “European pillar.” Here, existing contributions to European defence provided by the allies through NATO are crucial. Such an arrangement need not, therefore, entail any elaborate institutional engineering, but it does require political and strategic clarity.
Abstract by the author: Many U.S. defense officials expressed concern over the European Union’s (EU) November 2017 launch of its Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). They fear that a more capable EU would make it a competitor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for European security issues, and in so doing reduce U.S. influence in European security. Concerns about diminished U.S. influence and EU divergence from NATO as a result of PESCO are misguided. Rather than be concerned about the remote possibility of European strategic autonomy, the United States should throw its full support behind the PESCO initiative and other attempts to strengthen European defense. That said, the United States has an interest in the direction that the EU takes with PESCO and should therefore attempt to shape it constructively. First, the United States should insist that there be tight cooperation between EU and NATO capabilities development planning. Second, the United States should continue to pressure the EU about the issue of third country participation in PESCO projects. Third, the United States should open its own procurement processes to competition from European firms.
Abstract by the authors: The article informs that COVID-19 pandemic have laid risks to global food security. It mentions that major food shortages have emerged as yet, agricultural and food markets are facing disruptions because of labor shortages created by restrictions on movements of people and shifts in food demand resulting from closures of restaurants and schools as well as from income losses. It also mentions that economic fallout and food supply chain disruptions require attention from policy-makers.
Abstract by the author: This study utilizes recently published environmental extensions to the World Input–Output Database (WIOD) to compare production-based, consumption-based and technology-adjusted carbon emissions for 44 countries and country groups for the period 2000 to 2014. Results show some significant shifts in global emission trends compared to similar studies of the period before 2009. For 20 European Union (EU) countries and the US, emissions decreased over the period regardless of measure, and the same was true for the EU. Since GDP grew in 18 of these countries, the results provide unambiguous evidence for absolute, albeit modest, decoupling of economic growth from carbon emissions. The large increase in global emissions that nevertheless occurred during the period was driven almost entirely by increasing consumption in China and developing countries.
Abstract by the authors: Only with the three largest emitters (the EU, China and the US) building a coalition was it possible to conclude the Paris Agreement in 2015. With the announced withdrawal of the US, the interdependence between the EU and China has increased significantly. Both actors have reiterated their will to implement the Paris Agreement and to cooperate on climate change. In times of political constraints between the EU and China, this seems puzzling. The paper takes a role‐theoretic perspective to assess the following question: How can the changing roles of the EU and China, ascribed to them by external and internal expectations, explain their increased climate cooperation? It draws on a qualitative text analysis of policy documents and expert interviews. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings against the backdrop of growing tensions between the EU and China.
Abstract by the authors: This paper discusses the results of a study into the evolution of electronic commerce-related provisions in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and supplements them with a tripartite comparison of the e-commerce provisions in Chinese, EU, and US RTAs. As trade barriers related to electronic commerce are becoming ever more important in the global trade landscape and no explicit provisions exist at the multilateral level, it can be expected that WTO Members increasingly include provisions addressing such barriers, and electronic commerce more generally, at the bilateral and regional levels. This study applies a term-frequency analysis to the whole body of RTAs that contain e-commerce-related provisions, mapping the evolution of e-commerce chapters over time.
Abstracts by the authors: European Union (EU) trade policy is in the spotlight. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations triggered substantial public mobilization which emerged in a surge of literature on trade politicization. Notwithstanding politicization’s topicality and significance, it varies considerably over time, across trade agreements negotiations as well as across EU member states. By picking up on the latter, this article examines why, despite similar economic benefits potentially to be gained from trade liberalization, TTIP negotiations revealed striking differences in politicization in Germany and the UK. Understanding this variation is illustrated by highlighting the impact of some of TTIPs’ substantial issues mobilizing a range of materially and ideationally motivated stakeholders, who in turn shaped diverging governments’ trade positions of the countries under scrutiny. In explaining this selective politicization across two European countries, focus is on three explanatory variables, domestic material interests (business associations and trade unions), societal ideas (voters and non-governmental organizations [NGOs]) dominant in these countries’ domestic politics, as well as their interaction with national institutions. For this reason, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed which provides a detailed exploration of these three domestic factors, as well as the importance of their interdependence, in shaping the TTIP positions of the UK and German governments
Abstract by the author: A range of WTO scholars, policy experts, and governmental officials have bought into the notion that the Trump Administration’s unilateralism and its assault on China’s trade policies and practices could and should be channeled instead into WTO reform efforts. While dealing with China through unilateral tariff hikes and more recently a bilateral phase I agreement, the notion of addressing some concerns through WTO reform has not fallen entirely on a deaf ear in the Administration. Thus, Japan and the EU have been able to engage the Administration in an initiative to revise and add new WTO rules in the areas of subsidies, state enterprises, and forced technology transfer. This article offers a critical assessment of this initiative, arguing that by and large the proposed changes will add incoherence to existing WTO rules and make it more difficult for WTO Members to engage in economic and industrial policies that are needed, for example, to the address the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Abstract by the author: Although the WTO has fulfilled several key tasks it was set up to do - providing periodic reviews of members' trade policies, resolving disputes, supporting negotiations - with the notable exceptions of the Trade Facilitation and Information Technology agreements, WTO members have not been able to negotiate new rules on "bread and butter" trade policies. The importance of doing so was illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic which saw widespread uncoordinated recourse to trade policy instruments. This paper highlights four reforms that would bolster the effectiveness of the WTO as a forum for trade cooperation: (1) improving collection and reporting of information on trade-related policies; (2) supporting analysis informed deliberation to establish a common understanding of the need and scope for cooperation in specific policy areas; (3) putting in place a stronger multilateral governance framework for plurilateral cooperation between groups of WTO members; and (4) reestablishing an effective dispute settlement system.
Abstract by the author: At present, trade protectionism and economic populism are surging in the United States, with the Trump administration believing that the World Trade Organization (WTO) must end the “prejudice” against the US. By making threats and imposing pressure, focusing on plurilateral negotiations, leading the design of next-generation multilateral trade rules, coordinating positions with major allies, and confronting China with extreme attitudes, the US has been promoting WTO reform under the concept of “no construction without destruction,” in order to reshape the international economic and trade rules that maintain US hegemony and “Make America Great Again.” This self-serving practice, with the intention to regain dominance over the changes in global economic governance, is bound to erode the multilateral free trade system, dealing an unprecedented blow to the WTO and spreading inter-state economic and trade competition from bilateral to multilateral fields. The US determination to change the status quo, however, has also become the driving force of WTO reform. Despite highly diverse positions toward the reform, most countries appear to have a general consensus as to how the WTO is to survive: China and the United States must resolve their differences in order to assist WTO reform and achieve win-win results.
Abstract by the author: With the widening of the US measures three weeks before the end of the Trump administration, it falls on Biden to find a solution for the Airbus-Boeing dispute.
Abstract by the author: Since 1991 there has been a reinforcement of the World Market Economy, not least since China and the, then new Russian Federation have joined the World Trade Organization and because of EU Eastern enlargement and ASEAN integration deepening, while the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations seemed to indicate stronger regional integration dynamics. With the Trump Administration, the situation has changed dramatically as President Trump is supportive of neither multilateralism in general nor of the EU, which is weakened through BREXIT, in particular. Trump’s focus on the US merchandise trade balance deficit is ill-placed and import tariffs imposed on China seem to be excessive as the optimum tariff rate is miscalculated on the basis of the traditional formula – while a new adequate formula would include the role of sectoral US outward FDI stocks. Asia, the EU and the US could define fighting the Corona World Recession as a global public good, but the United States is weakened in the corona pandemic crisis; the EU is facing serious problems in avoiding a Euro Crisis 2 problem and the €750 billion EU loan package could undermine the Eurozone’s stability while being inadequate to minimize the risk of a Euro Crisis 2. At the same time, the prospects for EU cooperation are declining due to political disappointment concerning the national corona pandemic policy in some member countries. An effective anti-corona pandemic policy would mean to organize a consistent EU-ASEAN cooperation or a G20 cooperation with a later extension to UN Organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank and the WHO. Post-corona, global governance could change strongly because of the long-term political scarring effects of the pandemic shock which could undermine EU and Western stability. Networked international leadership in support of multilateralism is an innovative – but difficult - option for EU-ASEAN-Mercosur.
Abstract by the author: The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on some of the most sensitive questions surrounding international security. One of these is the US-Iran crisis, where the two countries have been on the brink of a full military confrontation since January. To date, both countries continue a zero-sum game, exploiting the pandemic as an opportunity to mount pressure on the adversary. Will the common threat caused by Covid-19 be able to divert Iran and the US from the collision course and push them towards more cooperative behaviour? This policy brief focuses on the cost that current confrontational strategies could have for both sides amid the Covid-19 outbreak, highlighting the threats and the political and strategic limitations that have emerged as a result of the pandemic. It also shows the potential gains at both the regional and the global levels that could arise for both actors if they were to adopt a new approach, based on health diplomacy and cooperation in health security.
Abstract by the authors: In the article, we explore the factors which brought about the transatlantic coordination of the policy of imposing sanctions on Iran. We will mainly focus on the events in the 21 century when the new incentives for cooperation appeared due to the growing concern over the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Considering the capabilities of using the tools of economic statecraft and diplomacy, we claim that the EU-US cooperation can be termed a co-leadership. The assessment and the reasons for the transatlantic break-up on this matter during the presidency of Donald Trump was examined using the concept of relative gains. We evaluate to what extent the initial goals were achieved in practice, and we also try to predict the possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As to whether the effectiveness of the sanctions through the cooperation has been enhanced, the answer is ambivalent. On the one hand, the cooperating transatlantic partners managed to coerce Iran through isolating the country from international economic contacts and negotiated the JCPOA. On the other hand, Trump’s renouncement of this agreement brought many negative consequences and undermined the earlier joint effort.
Abstract by the author: •The long cycles theory can be successfully combined with foresight methods.•The Trend Impact Analysis and the Scenario Building are suitable methods for this combination.•Drivers, possible events and indexes should be taken into consideration.•In the US-China relations both cooperative and confrontational futures are possible. By identifying recurring historical patterns, one could extrapolate future developments. However, drivers and possible events could trigger deviations from the extrapolation of historical patterns. Therefore, in order to enhance the value of the long cycles theory for futures studies one has to use appropriate foresight methods, including the Trend Impact Analysis and the Scenario Building. Firstly, this paper identifies eight most important drivers as far as the relationship between the US and China is concerned. Secondly, it quantifies the expected shifts in the distribution of power discussing their expected impact on the relationship between the current dominant power and its main challenger by using four indexes. Thirdly, it puts forward a list of possible events, evaluating their probability of occurrence. Last but not least, it posits three alternative scenarios for the US-China relationship and discusses each of them from the perspective of EU interests. The paper concludes that at present we have a bifurcated future in the US-China relationship, where both cooperative and confrontational futures are possible. It is in the EU’s interest to back the US, in order to secure a smoother transition of power and strengthen rather than weaken the transatlantic link.
Abstract by the author: Both before and during his presidency Donald Trump held fiercely negative views of America’s global rivals and economic competitors. Trump became ever more critical of China and the European Union (EU), including not least Germany, Europe’s leading economy. While at times Trump was willing to cooperate with China to contain North Korea, since late 2017/early 2018 he did not hesitate to impose increasingly larger tariffs and unleash a trade war with Beijing while also moving into the same direction toward Europe. This essay examines Trump’s motives and procedures, considers the internal discussions within his administration and analyzes the reaction of both China and the EU Commission. Trump brought transatlantic relations to near breaking point. He incentivized China to embark on a “charm offensive” toward the EU and caused a reluctant EU to move closer to China. At present, however, the EU countries still believe that it is in their interests to uphold the transatlantic relationship and their position as America’s most reliable allies. Due to Trump’s lack of interest in Europe, this stance, however, threatens to become the view of a minority among the EU countries.
Abstract by the author: A 2012 EU report stressed the need to be "sensitive" to the United States' "distinctive perspective on the region's security challenges."[34] Regarding China policy, the EU had difficulty buying into the hard-power logic of the pivot.[35] When China announced its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in 2013, for example, the EU did not raise serious objections. A 2012 report noted that "the EU's trade with East Asia (27.9% of our total trade) is now significantly greater than our trans-Atlantic trade (22.7%)", and that the "region thus offers substantial and rapidly expanding market opportunities for EU firms."50 The latest European Commission's China strategy, while calling China an economic competitor and systemic rival, remains committed to the EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership. In particular, the 17+1 mechanism, launched in 2012 between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), twelve of which are EU members, has created centrifugal forces threatening EU authority and unity.[59] BRI has sowed divisions within the EU and pulled states toward China's diplomatic agenda. In early 2018, such worries prompted 27 EU ambassadors in Beijing (out of the 28 EU member states) to warn against China's unilateralism and the influence it exercises through BRI.60 With the Brexit impending, divisions among EU members become a devastating vulnerability that invites extraregional powers to further weaken and divide Europe.
Abstract by the author: Emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, big data, 5G and biotechnology are paving the way towards defence modernisation in a growing number of states, particularly in the US, Russia and China. While AI technologies and their impact have been on the radar of European governments, there has been little scrutiny in Europe of how the evolving US approach to AI affects European defence and the broader transatlantic partnership. At the heart of the US defence modernisation programme is the artificial intelligence strategy unveiled by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2019. What implications does this have for Europe and for transatlantic cooperation? In examining this question this brief finds that cooperation with the US on the digital modernisation of defence remains a strategic necessity for Europe, but a mix of new and pre-existing dynamics in the relationship risks the emergence of a transatlantic digital divide. The brief is structured in three parts. The first part explores the key tenets of the DOD AI strategy. The second part examines challenges to the adoption of AI technologies in the US, many of which are shared by European partners. The third part of the brief explores the implications of the DOD AI strategy for European security.
Abstract by the authors: In October 2016, the White House, the European Parliament, and the UK House of Commons each issued a report outlining their visions on how to prepare society for the widespread use of artificial intelligence (AI). In this article, we provide a comparative assessment of these three reports in order to facilitate the design of policies favourable to the development of a ‘good AI society’. To do so, we examine how each report addresses the following three topics: (a) the development of a ‘good AI society’; (b) the role and responsibility of the government, the private sector, and the research community (including academia) in pursuing such a development; and (c) where the recommendations to support such a development may be in need of improvement. Our analysis concludes that the reports address adequately various ethical, social, and economic topics, but come short of providing an overarching political vision and long-term strategy for the development of a ‘good AI society’. In order to contribute to fill this gap, in the conclusion we suggest a two-pronged approach.
Abstract by the authors: This article outlines a new research agenda for the study of security policy coordination in Europe and North America. Despite the pressure to build coherent regional and transatlantic architectures to face common security challenges, since 9/11 the two regions have witnessed the coalescence of untidy bricolages of policy-coordination mechanisms—regional, sub-regional, and inter-regional; formal and informal; overarching and issue-specific; functional and dysfunctional. These dynamics raise relevant questions about how best to characterize, explain, and evaluate these network-driven types of policy coordination. Building on the literature on transgovernmental networks (TGNs), this article seeks to address these questions by proposing a comparative and cross-issue analytical framework that seeks to capture the particular forms and functions of existing security policy coordination initiatives across the Atlantic.
Abstract by the author: By emphasising the internal-external security nexus inherent in democratic security, the US could aspire again to lead through the example of its democracy’s resilience and ability to self-correct.
Abstract by the author: Criminal offenses with the most different modi operandi and levels of complexity can generate digital evidence, whether or not the actual crime is committed by using information and communication technology (ICT). The digital data that could be used as evidence in a later criminal prosecution is mostly in the hands of private companies who provide services on the Internet. These companies often store their customers’ data on cloud servers that are not necessarily located in the same jurisdiction as the company. Law enforcement and prosecution authorities then need to take two steps that are not exclusive for evidence of a digital nature. First, they need to discover where the data is located—with which company and in which jurisdiction. Second, they need to obtain the data. In considering digital evidence, the last step, however, is complicated by new issues that form the focus of this paper. The first concern is the practice by companies to dynamically distribute data over globally spread data centers in the blink of an eye. This is a practical concern as well as a legal concern. The second issue is the slowness of the currently applicable international legal framework that has not yet been updated to a fast-paced society where increasingly more evidence is of a digital nature. The slowness of traditional mutual legal assistance may be no news. The lack of a suitable legal framework for competent authorities that need to obtain digital evidence in a cross-border manner, nonetheless, creates a landscape of diverse initiatives by individual states that try to remedy this situation. A third issue is the position that companies are put in by the new EU proposal to build a legal framework governing production orders for digital evidence. With companies in the driver's seat of a cross-border evidence gathering operation, guarantees of the traditional mutual legal assistance framework seem to be dropped. A fourth issue is the position of data protection safeguards. US based companies make for significant data suppliers for criminal investigations conducted by EU based authorities. Conflicting legal regimes affect the efficiency of data transfers as well as the protection of personal data to citizens.
Abstract by the author: Two decades after the 9/11 attacks, homegrown jihadist violence (HJV) in the West has almost disappeared, but the causes and conditions fomenting the phenomenon have not changed much. In this paper, I argue that, despite the security services’ ability to physically destroy the structures and networks of HJV in separate national contexts, the spectre of HJV is haunting theWest as a transnational problem. Dealing effectively with this problem requires a comprehensive understanding of the root causes of HJV and its cross-level and transnational origins. This paper examines such causes through the lens of International Relations’ levels of analysis, which allows us to categorize and explain those causes at individual, group, and international levels. The paper seeks to add new insight to the HJV literature and, at the same time, provide a pre-theoretical basis for a broader debate on the causes of this global security problem.
Abstract by the author: Drawing on the developing literature on a ‘European penology’ this article seeks to use counterterrorism as a lens through which to re-examine arguments concerning penal moderation in Europe. Counterterrorism measures adopted in the EU and the USA in the post-9/11 period are therefore scrutinized for the lessons they hold about the role of European values and institutions as a ‘shield’ against punitiveness or indeed their ability to, swordlike, cut deep into citizens’ freedoms. The resulting analysis raises questions about the need for a more refined approach to the question of ‘European’ penal values as well as pointing up the continued existence of a culture of rights in the USA.
Abstract by the author: Like other transnational threats such as climate change, the extinction of biological species, SARS or Ebola, the current COVID-19 confronts the modern utopia of rigid borders between nations and contemporary finance-led neoliberal economic models. Acknowledging the complexity of COVID-19’s root causes, this paper builds on the contradictions between science, expertise and policy in the definition of global human security, and sketches five possible future international scenarios. I argue that in the aftermath of the pandemic any sort of future global, regional and state regulation will need to consider transnational threats not only to ensure the security of individuals, but also to guarantee the long-standing durability of the biosphere as a life-supporting system. To uphold this argument, I develop three sections: (i) the nature of the threat; (ii) the geopolitical tensions that COVID-19 heightens; and (iii) possible future scenarios.
Abstract by the author: Using the persecution of Muslims in India that is currently taking place against the backdrop of the COVID-19 global pandemic as an illustrative case, this essay identifies the dynamics of the organization of ideological discourse by populist leaders in times of unexpected crisis. The organization of ideological discourse represents strategic, discursive acts committed by populist leaders aimed at foregrounding social conditions that would function in the advancement of various political ends—whether those ends may be the consolidation of power, the undermining of institutional systems of checks and balances, the implementation of exclusionary or injurious policies against disenfranchised constituents, the suspension of civil liberties, or a combination thereof. It is engendered through a three-stage process. In the first stage, surface-level validation by legitimate institutional actors confirms preconceived ideas about a constructed enemy. In the second stage, inflammatory rhetoric is deployed by populist leaders, which scapegoat that constructed enemy. These two stages culminate to create widespread moral panic in society. With moral panic firmly established, in the third stage an environment of fear and paranoia becomes susceptible to the enactment of symbolic and physical violence against the constructed enemy. The essay concludes with some words on the pressing need to deconstruct ideologically motivated discourses related to COVID-19.
Abstract by the authors: Sovereignist claims are on the rise – in Europe, the USA, and beyond. In dealing with processes such as globalization and supranational integration, which have progressively shifted powers and competencies away from nation states, these transformations have created a fertile terrain for reactions against the sources of such insecurity, which find full expression in the sovereignist claims to 'take back control', that is to say to return to the traditional understanding of sovereignty being based upon mutually exclusive territories. These sources of insecurity and social unrest have also provided structures of political opportunity for the electoral success of populist parties. Despite its relevance for the understanding of the populist discourse, however, sovereignty has been largely under-theorised by scholars dealing with populism. Accordingly, we propose a new research agenda to study populist mobilization that focuses on the linkage between populism and sovereignism, while also encouraging further theoretical and empirical studies, focusing on both the demand side and the supply side. In particular, we suggest some crucial aspects with which the Special Issue seeks to engage, before pointing to some substantial implications that are likely to emerge from the findings of this research agenda.
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